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INTRODUCTION 
s transnational firms traverse the planet in today’s global economy, 
they conduct many of their business activities beyond the legal 
reach of nation-states.1 To some, this seems like one of globalization’s 
most troubling consequences.2 The conventional wisdom predicts that, if 
unchecked, corporations will freely flout societal interests and impose 
significant external costs on the public.3 However, globalization has been 
expanding the role of nongovernmental actors in shaping global gover-
nance.4 This trend tends to placate detrimental corporate conduct in the 
absence of governmental enforcement authority.5 Indeed, globalization 
has not only heralded a “global economy,” but has also brought about the 
phenomenon of a broader “global civil society.”6 Increasingly alert to the 
social and ecological dimensions of transnational corporate conduct, 
global civil society stands to exert significant regulatory control over 
firms simply by propounding public preferences and expectations.7 These 
                                                                                                             
 1. See generally John H. Dunning, Introduction to GOVERNMENTS, GLOBALIZATION, 
AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 1–2 (John H. Dunning ed., 1997) (discussing the emergent 
relationship between the national jurisdiction and the mobility of multinational enter-
prise); KENICHI OHMAE, Preface to THE EVOLVING GLOBAL ECONOMY: MAKING SENSE OF 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER, at xiii (Kenichi Ohmae ed., 1995); Peter E. Drucker, The Glob-
al Economy and the Nation State, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 159 (discussing the 
political economy of globalization and noting the dynamic of the relative decrease of 
nation-states’ regulatory authority). 
 2. See generally RICHARD BARNET & RONALD MUELLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE 
POWER OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 1 (1974) (providing an excellent discussion 
on the dynamics that ensue as a result of multinational corporations’ global reach). 
 3. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND 
POWER 113 (2004). 
 4. See Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private  
Authority in the International System, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 4 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002); see 
also James N. Rosenau, Governance in the Twenty-First Century, 1 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 13, 13–22 (1995); Jan Aart Scholte, ‘In The Foothills’: Relations Between 
the IMF and Civil Society, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL 
SYSTEM 256, 256 (Richard A. Higgot, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill & Andreas Bieler eds, 
2000). See generally A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter, Private Authority 
and International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3, 3 (A. 
Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter eds., 1999). 
 5. See THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 30–35 
(1989). 
 6. See Cutler, Haufler & Porter, supra note 4, at 3, 20. See generally Ronnie D. Lip-
schutz & Cathleen Fogel, “Regulation for the rest of us?” Global Civil Society and the 
Privatization of Transnational Regulation, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 115, 115 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002). 
 7. See DONALDSON, supra note 5, at 30–35. 
A
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preferences and expectations constrain corporate conduct and explain 
why firms have begun to self-impose civil regulations that proactively 
accommodate broader moral and social concerns.8 
Also known as “soft law” 9  or “quasi-legislation,” 10  voluntary civil 
regulations will prove an important alternative to governmental authority 
in the era of globalization.11 These emerging trends are arguably only the 
“tip” of a larger global social contract that has been forming in light of 
society’s demand for corporate social responsibility (“CSR”).12 In foster-
ing soft law, this new global governance paradigm13 reignites timeless 
                                                                                                             
 8. Jem Bendell uses the term “civil regulation” to refer to regimes situated between 
self-regulation by business and “hard” regulation by government. Jem Bendell, Civil 
Regulation: A New Form of Democratic Governance for the Global Economy?, in TERMS 
FOR ENDEARMENT: BUSINESS, NGOS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 238, 246–49 (Jem 
Bendell ed., 2000). 
 9. The term “soft law” generally refers to non-binding, quasi-legal instruments, or to 
mechanisms whose binding force is relatively weaker than conventional legal instru-
ments. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human 
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 
960 (2004); see also Alan C. Neal, Corporate Social Responsibility: Governance Gain or 
Laissez-Faire Figleaf?, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 459, 464 (2008). From the stand-
point of the international law nomenclature, “soft law” refers to international agreements 
not concluded as treaties and thus not yet binding. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, The 
Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF 
NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 100, 113–14 (Dinah Shelton 
ed., 2000); Antonio Vives, Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Law and Mar-
kets and the Case of Developing Countries, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199, 216 (2008). In 
addition, “soft law” denotes a self-contained set of obligations arising out of the occa-
sional preference of nation-states to reach non-binding agreements and to pattern rela-
tions in ways that avoid application of treaty or customary law. See Hartmut Hillgenberg, 
A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 499, 501 (1999) (discussing the nature of 
the transnational self-regulatory and co-regulatory structures); see also Rebecca Kathleen 
Atkins, Multinational Enterprises and Workplace Reproductive Health: Extending Cor-
porate Social Responsibility, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 233, 239 (2007); Ilias Bantekas, 
Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 B. U. INT’L L.J. 309, 317 
(2004); Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the 
Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 645 
(2004). 
 10. See GABRIELE GANZ, QUASI-LEGISLATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECOND-
ARY LEGISLATION 16–22 (2d ed. 1987). 
 11. See Christoph Knill & Dirk Lehmkuhl, Private Actors and the State: Internatio-
nalization and Changing Patterns of Governance, 15 GOVERNANCE 41, 43 (2002). 
 12. See generally THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A 
SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 233–36 (1999). In some sense, as a 
form of voluntary governance, corporate social responsibility was precipitated by global 
civil society’s pressure and constrains on multinational business interest. 
 13. Thomas Kuhn employed the term “paradigm” in an effort to account for the way 
that fields of knowledge are constituted by shared systems of belief which are defined by 
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principles and values such as human rights, environmental sustainability, 
responsible citizenship, and corporate accountability, as well as integrity 
and credibility of character.14 As a result transnational firms, despite their 
wherewithal, are now vulnerable as their brands have become susceptible 
to reputational harm in response to breaches of the social contract.15 
Consequently, these firms are establishing regulatory regimes in an effort 
to build reputational capital and thereby enhance, or at least safeguard, 
their bottom lines.16 
Global civil society primarily demands that businesses abide norms of 
social responsibility in their pursuit of profit.17 This emphasis on the 
“character” of transnational business conduct is a departure from the  
entrenched metaphor that sees corporations as amoral profit machines, 
utterly devoid of moral character or probity.18 The fact that transnational 
firms adopt civil regulations voluntarily in order to build credibility in 
the eyes of global civil society—i.e., the fact that firms proactively 
                                                                                                             
a common vocabulary, a set of accepted problems and agreed-upon solutions. THOMAS S. 
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 175 (2d ed. 1970). Thus, on the one 
hand, a paradigm defines a community of belief; on the other hand, communities of belief 
do not exist but for the shared beliefs, acknowledged problems and solutions that com-
prise a paradigm. See id. Although Kuhn’s book was aimed at the history of changes in 
the physical or “hard” sciences, John Kenneth Galbraith expresses a similar notion that is 
closer to the context of the present study: “The first requirement for an understanding of 
contemporary economic and social life is a clear view of the relation between events and 
the ideas which interpret them.” JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 6 (4th ed. 
1984). As to the emerging paradigm, stemming from the new forms of global corporate 
governance, the following passage is prescient: 
“Tomorrow’s successful company can no longer afford to be a faceless institution that 
does nothing more than sell the right product at the right price. It will have to present 
itself as if it were . . . an intelligent actor, of upright character, that brings explicit moral 
judgment to bear on its dealings with its own employees and with the wider world.” 
Anonymous, Saints and Sinners, THE ECONOMIST, June 24, 1995, at 15. 
 14. See generally William C. Frederick, The Moral Authority of Transnational Cor-
porate Codes, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 165, 165 (1991) (discussing how moral guidelines incor-
porated in various regulatory instruments influence sundry corporate practices). 
 15. See Harold James, The Ethics of Business Life: Some Historical Reflections, in 
RETHINKING BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 9, 14–15 (Samuel Gregg & James R. Stoner eds., 
2008). 
 16. Kevin T. Jackson, Natural Law, Human Rights, and Corporate Reputational Cap-
ital in Global Governance, 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE 440, 451 (2008). 
 17. See generally LYNN S. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT: WHY COMPANIES MUST MERGE 
SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL IMPERATIVES TO ACHIEVE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 47 (2003) 
(arguing that beyond good public relations, corporate social responsibility is a powerful 
tool for achieving superior performance and generating greater profits). 
 18. See generally Gareth Morgan, Paradigms, Metaphors and Problem Solving in 
Organization Theory, 25 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 605, 616. (1980) (providing a critique of the 
metaphors that have “imprisoned” organization theory). 
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comply with the new global social contract—presupposes that inter-
national businesses are able to distinguish moral choices and then make 
them.19 
Unlike traditional legal regimes whose norms are enforced through 
centralized systems of sanctions, the emergent soft law norms of global 
economic governance rely on decentralized enforcement mechanisms.20 
These emergent norms are not the product of parochial regulation or  
local cultural mores.21 Rather, they represent the expectations of various 
economic communities around the world that together comprise global 
civil society.22 Thus, the promulgation of voluntary civil regulations by 
firms reveals an acceptance of extant global social contracts borne of 
growing global societal consensus as to the proper performance, respon-
siveness, and responsibility of transnational corporations.23 
Consequently, transnational business enterprises are further commit-
ting to rule-making and rule-implementation in the spheres of social and 
environmental responsibility. 24  They engage in inter-firm cooperation 
and collaborate with nongovernmental organizations. 25  Over the past 
decade, CSR has gained prominence in both developed and developing 
countries at local, national, regional, and international levels.26  Inter-
national businesses are therefore under increasing pressure from civil 
society organizations and corporate accountability networks that monitor 
                                                                                                             
 19. See Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B. Matthews Jr., Can a Corporation Have a 
Conscience?, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 132, 135. 
 20. See RICHARD HOLME & PHILIP WATTS, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
MAKING GOOD BUSINESS SENSE 20 (2000); see also Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization,  
Governance and Corporate Citizenship, 1 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP 15, 15–23 (2001). 
 21. See generally CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISE 23 (1982) (providing examples and discussing distinctions among various 
forms of regulation). 
 22. See id. at 295–96; see also Scholte, supra note 20, at 19–21. 
 23. See Thomas W. Dunfee, Business Ethics and Extant Social Contracts, 1 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 23, 24 (1991). 
 24. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 18 
(2000); see also Cutler, Haufler & Porter, supra note 4, at 3. 
 25. See SIMON ZADEK, THE CIVIL CORPORATION: THE NEW ECONOMY OF CORPORATE 
CITIZENSHIP 91 (rev. ed. 2007). See generally CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
READING AND CASES IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 1 (Andrew Crane, Dirk Matten & Laura 
Spence eds., 2008). 
 26. See generally Archie Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a 
Definitional Construct, 38 BUS. & SOC’Y 268, 268 (1999); Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, 
Corporate Citizenship: Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 166, 166 (2005). 
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business conduct. 27  In response, these firms are adopting responsible 
business policies.28 
Although the conventional views of corporate governance—
”shareholder theory” and “stakeholder theory”29—reach divergent con-
clusions about the proper nature and scope of CSR, both evolved at a 
time when firms were constrained, at least in principle, by the rule of law 
and legal sanctions. 30  Yet, unlike traditional hard law enforcement  
regimes, today’s emerging “civil regulations” are grounded in the “rule 
of reputation,” which ties accountability solely to reputational capital, or 
lack thereof.31 Operating internationally and faced with pressure to self-
regulate, a company’s reputation has become one of its most valuable 
assets.32 Today’s companies must reconcile economic and moral value 
with traditional notions of corporate governance. 
                                                                                                             
 27. See generally Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, Toward a Political Con-
ception of Corporate Responsibility: Business and Society Seen from a Habermasian 
Perspective, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1096, 1096–120 (2007). 
 28. See ZADEK, supra note 25, at 63. 
 29. Shareholder theory states that the corporation should serve the interests of share-
holders only. See ARCHIE B. CARROLL & ANN K. BUCHHOLTZ, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: 
ETHICS AND STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 832–85 (7th ed. 2009). Grounded in agency 
theory, the underlying idea is that shareholders differ from other constituencies by virtue 
of being residual risk-bearers, and as such should exercise control over the firm. See id. at 
84. Agency theory further asserts that, as residual risk-bearers, shareholders are in the 
best position to ensure that firms operate efficiently and focus on profit maximization. 
Thus, corporate managers answer only to shareholders and act only with the interests of 
shareholders in mind. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). 
Stakeholder theory, on the other hand, maintains that since business serves the larger 
society, managers must be responsive to a broad constellation of constituencies both 
within and outside of the firm. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A 
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 43 (1984). This theory is based on the premise that the em-
ployees of a corporation, especially its managers and directors, can be held accountable 
for harmful side-effects of corporate conduct. Id. Corporate employees should be held 
accountable for the realization of a variety of objectives of the corporation. Such widen-
ing of responsibility is deemed essential as stockholders’ liability is often remote and 
financially limited. Id.; see also Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder 
Analysis, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 53, 53–55 (1991). See generally Morey W. McDaniel, Stock-
holders and Shareholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121, 126 (1991). 
 30. Thomas Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality, 62 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, 129, 134–35. 
 31. See KEVIN T. JACKSON, BUILDING REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL: STRATEGIES FOR 
INTEGRITY AND FAIR PLAY THAT IMPROVE THE BOTTOM LINE 28 (2004); see also Jackson, 
supra note 16, at 443–44. 
 32. Alasdair Ross, Reputation: Risk of Risks, THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 
Dec. 2005, at 2; see Robert O. Keohane, Complex Accountability and Power in Global 
Governance: Issues for Global Business, 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE 361, 365 (2008). 
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In this Article, I will argue that corporate governance must focus on 
the role of soft law in today’s global environment. Soft law is a novel 
mechanism for constraining corporate behavior. In reconciling financial 
and social imperatives, firms must consider its impact on reputational 
capital. In Part I, I analyze the emergence of the CSR paradigm and its 
connection to global corporate governance. By examining its history, I 
will first illustrate how the CSR movement has rendered firms’ reputa-
tions accountable to the movement’s demands, and then I will trace the 
conceptual expansion of CSR to the related notions of “corporate social 
responsiveness” and “corporate social performance.” In Part II, I  
examine alternative conceptual models of global corporate governance 
including the “monophonic” model, the “polyphonic” model, the “inte-
grative social contracts” model, and finally, the “reputational capital” 
model. In Part III, I examine specific types of global civil regulations in 
detail, and I discuss the bases for why global corporations accept the 
emerging soft law regime. After highlighting the chief characteristics of 
civil regulations in light of the underlying regulatory aim to bind firms 
and markets to worldwide norms, I will discuss the dominant forms of 
civil regulation within the triad of voluntary self-regulation, inter-firm 
and cross-industry initiatives, and co-regulation and multi-stakeholder 
partnerships.33 In Part IV, I build on the discussion in Parts II and III to 
analyze the role reputational accountability mechanisms play in securing 
firms’ compliance with global civil regulations. After distinguishing  
reputational accountability from legal accountability, I will explain the 
operational components of reputational accountability, the process by 
which key constituents of transnational firms enforce the “rule of rep-
utation,” and the strategic and operational implications firms face as a 
result of such enforcement. In Part V, I take on arguments in opposition 
to the emerging paradigm of global civil regulation. 
I. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE PARADIGM 
A. History of Corporate Social Responsibility 
The origins of the modern debate on corporate social responsibility can 
be traced to the early 1950s. Howard Bowen, a renowned economist, first 
coined the phrase when he argued that economic and social benefits 
would result if businesses introduced broader social goals into their  
                                                                                                             
 33. See David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct 25–26 
(Center for Responsible Business, Working Paper No. 34, 2006), available at http:// 
escholarship.org/uc/item/8g66g3hf. 
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decision-making processes.34 In the 1960s, the argument was extended 
further with the assertion that ethical principles should govern a corp-
oration’s relationship with society.35 In the 1970s, the view emerged that 
business should not only protect but also improve the welfare of society.36  
Regarding the global context, attention to the ethics of international 
business has been mounting ever since the late 1960s.37 It began as an 
activist movement aimed at U.S.-based multinational companies in 
France and later spread to other parts of the world.38 Less-developed 
countries were especially worried about outside infiltration into their 
economies and the resulting dilution of national control. Yet, at the same 
time, as a means of economic development, they were interested in  
attracting foreign investment that would lead to a rise in employment. 
The expansion of direct foreign investment around the world prompted 
attempts to create codes of business conduct at the intra-firm and inter-
national levels.39 One notable example of this dynamic could be seen as 
early as the 1940s with the promulgation in the United Nations of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.40 Another later example is the 
attempted development of a Voluntary Code of Conduct for Transnation-
al Corporations at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (“UNCTAD”) beginning in the 1970s.41 Similarly, national legis-
                                                                                                             
 34. See, e.g., HOWARD ROTHMANN BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 
BUSINESSMAN 8 (1953). 
 35. See RICHARD EELLS & CLARENCE WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
BUSINESS 455–57 (3d ed. 1961). 
 36. See KEITH P. DAVIS & ROBERT L. BLOMSTROM, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: 
ENVIRONMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 8–9, 20–21 (3d ed. 1975). 
 37. See generally BARNET & MUELLER, supra note 2, at 113 (1974); JEAN JACQUES 
SERVAN-SCHREIBER, Le Défi américain [THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE] 1 (1968) (Fr.) (pro-
viding a provocative angle on America-style management, business, and ethics); 
RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 1 (1971) (a seminal book that was widely 
acclaimed to be “no more than the tip of an iceberg”). 
 38. See, e.g., BARNET & MUELLER, supra note 2, at 113. 
 39. See DONALDSON, supra note 5, at 35–39; see also Paul M. Minus, Introduction to 
THE ETHICS OF BUSINESS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 1, 1 (Paul M. Minus ed., 1993); ROBERT 
C. SOLOMON, THE NEW WORLD OF BUSINESS: ETHICS AND FREE ENTERPRISE IN THE 
GLOBAL 1990S, at 167 (1994). See generally THEODORE H. MORAN, MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 1 (1985) (pre-
senting an extensive and a thorough discussion of the sociopolitical developments result-
ing from spread of multinational corporations). 
 40. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 41. See Development and International Economic Cooperation: Transnational Corpo-
rations, U.N. ESCOR, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (June 12, 1990); see also Draft 
United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 I.L.M. 626 (1984) 
(setting forth comprehensive norms of transnational corporate conduct). Moreover, in 
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latures, backed by enforcement regimes, adjusted their laws to reach 
transnational firms doing business overseas.42 International treaties and 
national legislation, however, did not succeed everywhere in combating 
misconduct. Rather, in a significant number of cases, business reforms 
were precipitated by public outrage at corporate malfeasance.43 
In the 1980s, a number of ecological and social calamities began im-
pacting the reputations of individual firms and the corporate world in 
general.44 The ensuing reputational crises vividly illustrated the conse-
quences of embracing a self-regulating, profit-maximizing, shareholder-
focused brand of corporate governance, notwithstanding its substantial 
reputational risks. 45  Hitherto, the traditional governance paradigm of 
multinational corporations rigidly stressed shareholder profit maximiza-
tion.46 Essentially, in an effort to reach narrowly defined goals in the 
form of financial targets, many transnational firms failed to consider how 
backlash from public perceptions of raw corporate greed could affect 
business.47 Instead, leading and aspiring multinational corporations tra-
versed the globe seeking locations that offered low labor costs and lax 
environmental and socioeconomic regulations.48 
With the advent of the 1990s came a succession of ecological crises 
stemming from morally questionable business practices. This propelled  
                                                                                                             
1977 the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted its Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises, calling upon businesses to voluntarily 
comply with ILO conventions and recommendations. See Int’l Labour Organization 
[ILO], Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422, para. 6 (1977). 
 42. Arlene I. Broadhurst, Corporations and the Ethics of Social Responsibility: An 
Emerging Regime of Expansion and Compliance, 9 BUS. ETHICS: A EURO. REV. 86, 88 
(2000). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Noteworthy examples are the Bhopal disaster involving leakage of deadly MIC 
gas from one of Union Carbide’s industrial plants, and the widespread calls for disin-
vestment of U.S.-based multinationals from apartheid South Africa. See Cortelyou Ken-
ney, Comment, Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational 
Human Rights Litigation, 97 CAL. L. REV. 857, 875 (2009); see also Kenneth A. Rodman, 
Public and Private Sanctions Against South Africa, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 313, 320 (1994). 
 45. See European Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework 
for Corporate Responsibility, COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0366en01.pdf (last vi-
sited Sept. 1, 2009) [hereinafter EU Green Paper]. 
 46. See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to  
Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970. 
 47. Debora Spar, The Spotlight and the Bottom Line, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 1998, 
at 7–9. 
 48. See Morton Winston, NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Responsi-
bility, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 71, 72–73 (2002). 
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multinational corporations further into the spotlight. The Exxon Valdes 
disaster in Prince William Sound and the Royal Dutch Shell controversy 
over the disposal of the Brent Spar in the North Sea were two well-
publicized incidents that caused considerable damage to the reputations 
of the firms involved. Royal Dutch Shell also suffered reputational dam-
age over its apparent complicity with the execution of Ogoni indigenous 
leaders in Nigeria, and Nike suffered significant backlash, especially be-
tween 1992 and 1997, when reports regarding the company’s operations 
in Southeast Asia spawned public concern over child labor and poor 
working conditions in “sweatshops.”49 
As a result of these public controversies, corporations began guarding 
their reputations while global civil society began questioning the unreg-
ulated market dominance of transnational firms.50 Such unbridled control 
was exacerbating social inequalities and human rights violations while 
endangering the earth’s ecological systems and depleting natural re-
sources.51 
Seeking institutional authority to voice its position, global civil society 
condemned multinational corporations collectively for failure to provide 
proper employment conditions and decent wages, and for failure to foster 
human rights as mandated by the United Nations Declarations and Inter-
national Labor Organization Conventions and Recommendations.52 With 
respect to ecology, civil society began to insist that firms comply with 
United Nations’ agreements and conventions on development and the 
environment.53 Furthermore, pressured by civil society, firms began to 
recognize state-sanctioned environmental regulations promulgated by 
regional organizations, such as the European Commission.54 
Consequently, in the latter part of the 1990s, many firms began advo-
cating the notion that responsible corporate conduct produces mid- to 
long-term financial rewards.55 This idea stood in opposition to the long-
                                                                                                             
 49. See U.N. Res. Inst. For Soc. Dev., Business Responsibility for Sustainable Devel-
opment Project, Working Paper: Barricades and Boardrooms: a Contemporary History 
of the Corporate Accountability Movement, 32–34 (2004) (prepared by Jem Bendell) 
[hereinafter Barricades and Boardrooms]; DEBORA L. SPAR & JENNIFER BURNS, HITTING 
THE WALL: NIKE AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR PRACTICES Harvard Business School case 
700-047 7–9 (rev. 2002). 
 50. Ngaire Woods, Global Governance and Role of Institutions, in GOVERNING 
GLOBALIZATION 25, 32 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002). 
 51. See Winston, supra note 48, at 72–73. 
 52. Barricades and Boardrooms, supra note 49, at 14–16. 
 53. Winston, supra note 48, at 72–73. 
 54. Scholte, supra note 20, at 15. 
 55. See generally John G. Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, 
Actors and Practices, 10 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 499, 499–504 (2004). 
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held notion that corporate wealth is solely grounded in maximization of 
profits for stockholders.56 Firms that were clinging to the conventional 
viewpoint were equally opposed to the advent of CSR because they  
believed it entailed significant financial costs.57 To this day, the inter-
national business community remains at odds over these divergent  
perspectives. Nevertheless, several features of CSR have gained promi-
nence, including: 
 Adoption of voluntary initiatives aimed at elevating the ethical 
level of operations above that which is required by law; 
 Internalization of externalities; 
 Consideration of a range of stakeholder interests; 
 Integration of the firm’s social and economic mandates; 
 Contributions to nonprofit, charitable, and other civic organiza-
tions and causes; 
 Provision of employee benefits and improvement of quality of 
life in the workplace.58 
B. Social Responsibility, Responsiveness, and Performance Distin-
guished 
Scholars have crafted a distinction between CSR, which stresses obli-
gations and accountability, and “corporate social responsiveness,” which 
emphasizes action and activity.59 But beyond these distinctions, there is a 
third, results-oriented concept known as “corporate social performance.” 
Below, I will explain all three perspectives on social-awareness. 
1. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Some say it is futile to attempt an operational definition of CSR be-
cause there are too many conceivable applications of CSR.60 But, broadly 
stated, CSR merely implies that businesses share responsibility for  
societal conditions. Archie Carroll separates business obligations into 
                                                                                                             
 56. Friedman, supra note 46, at 32. 
 57. Winston, supra note 48, at 85. 
 58. See generally CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: READING AND CASES IN 
GLOBAL CONTEXT, supra note 25, at 1. 
 59. See William C. Frederick, From CSR-1 to CSR-2: The Maturing of Business-and-
Society Thought, 33 BUS. & SOC’Y 150, 150–54 (1994) [hereinafter CSR-1 to CSR-2]; see 
also Barry M. Mitnick, Systematics and CSR: The Theory and Processes of Normative 
Referencing, 34 BUS. & SOC’Y 5, 6 (1995). 
 60. See Edwin M. Epstein, The Corporate Social Policy Process and the Process of 
Corporate Governance, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 361, 374 (1987). 
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four classes: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary.61 A firm has an 
economic responsibility to provide goods and services, offer employment 
at a living wage, and generate profits to survive.62 Through these obliga-
tions, firms enhance societal well-being. Similarly, corporations shoulder 
legal responsibilities imposed by courts, legislatures, and administrative 
agencies. 63  These responsibilities can assume many forms and may  
extend to consumers, employees, stockholders, suppliers, and other 
stakeholders.64 
In addition, CSR signifies conformity to society’s expectations of  
appropriate business behavior such as honoring unwritten ethical stan-
dards.65 For example, while corporations are not legally bound to contri-
bute to charities, many citizens expect profitable enterprises to do so.66 
Moreover, as law sometimes lags behind social norms, some of society’s 
normative expectations may eventually evolve into law.67 Lastly, some of 
society’s expectations are not clearly defined for corporations.68 For in-
stance, although society might expect corporations to invest in efforts to 
resolve significant social problems, society does not have a clear idea of 
what shape or form those solutions might take.69 
                                                                                                             
 61. See Archie B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate 
Social Performance, 4 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 497, 503 (1979). 
 62. Peter Drucker elaborates this point of view as follows: 
Economic performance is the first responsibility of business. A business that 
does not show a profit at least equal to its cost of capital is socially irresponsi-
ble. It wastes society’s resources. Economic performance is the basis; without 
it, a business cannot discharge any other responsibilities, cannot be a good em-
ployer, a good citizen, a good neighbor. But economic performance is not the 
sole responsibility of business. 
PETER F. DRUCKER, POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 101 (1993). 
 63. See generally JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETHICS AND THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS 1 (4th 
ed. 2003). 
 64. For instance, legal responsibilities imposed by FDA, FTC, OSHA, CPSC, EPA, 
EEOC, and SEC regulations, to name but a handful from the morass of U.S. regulatory 
agencies. See id. at 111, 210, 264, 272, 306–11, 339. 
 65. See id. at 369. 
 66. See Carroll, supra note 61, at 500. 
 67. See id. at 502–04. 
 68. See id. at 500. 
 69. See id. at 500. 
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2. Corporate Social Responsiveness 
Robert Ackerman and Raymond Bauer claim that the term “social re-
sponsiveness” is a label more apt for a process-focused social outlook.70 
Ackerman and Bauer have argued that emphasizing companies’ obliga-
tions places too much importance on motivation rather than on perfor-
mance.71 In their words, “Responding to social demands is much more 
than deciding what to do. There remains the management task of doing 
what one has decided to do, and this task is far from trivial.”72 Focus on 
responsiveness allows companies to fulfill social responsibilities without 
being distracted by issues of accountability that arise when organizations 
attempt, prior to acting, to determine their precise responsibilities. 73  
Social responsiveness addresses a firm’s ability to be alert to social pres-
sures.74 Thus, rather than simply reacting to a crisis, the socially respon-
sive firm would have preempted the crisis by implementing a process 
enabling it to foresee predicaments and be proactive in a productive and 
humanitarian manner.75 
3. Corporate Social Performance (“CSP”) 
Under the “performance” viewpoint, it is firms’ capabilities that are 
paramount.76 In other words, once a firm accepts that it has a “social re-
sponsibility” and adopts a responsiveness mentality, it is the results 
achieved thereafter that are critical. Constructing a CSP framework re-
quires more than a determination of the nature of the responsibility.77 It 
also involves articulating certain philosophies, patterns, modes, or strate-
gies of responsiveness.78 Carroll has designed a CSP model around three 
key facets: (1) social responsibility categories—economic, legal, ethical, 
and discretionary; (2) philosophies (or modes) of social responsiveness—
reaction, defense, accommodation, and pro-action; and (3) social (or 
                                                                                                             
 70. See ROBERT ACKERMAN & RAYMOND BAUER, CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIVENESS: THE MODERN DILEMMA 6–7 (1976). 
 71. See id. at 6. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See CSR-1 to CSR-2, supra note 59, at 154; see also Edwin M. Epstein, The Cor-
porate Social Policy Process: Beyond Business Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Corporate Social Responsiveness, 29 CAL. MGMT. REV. 99, 104 (1987). 
 75. BOATRIGHT, supra note 63, at 370 (discussing the difference between responsi-
bility and responsiveness). 
 76. See Carroll, supra note 61, at 502, 504 (explaining the use of the social performance 
model to guide managerial actions in responding to a range of business obligations). 
 77. See id. at 500 (illustrating an elaborate framework of the “social issues involved”). 
 78. See id. at 501. 
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stakeholder) issues involved—consumer issues, environmental issues, 
and employee issues.79 This configuration illustrates that corporate social 
responsibility is not separate from financial performance. Moreover, it 
places ethical and philanthropic expectations into a rational, economic, 
and legal structure.80 
C. Corporate Social Responsibility and Global Governance 
As the preceding discussion suggests, the emergence of CSR81 poses a 
challenge to a corporate governance framework centered on shareholder 
value creation.82 The rise of CSR has engendered a debate about the  
ultimate purpose and essential nature of a business corporation.83 The 
competing visions expose conflicting political and moral preferences 
regarding the corporation’s nature.84 In the same vein, scholars sympa-
thetic to CSR argue that both the contractual model of the firm, where 
the corporation is seen as a “nexus of contracts,”85 and the legal person 
model, where a corporation has a distinct legal personality,86  do not  
establish a basis for conferring superior property rights to shareholders 
over employees.87 It is argued instead that employees contributing labor 
                                                                                                             
 79. See id. at 502–04; Archie B. Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsi-
bility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders, BUS. HORIZONS, 
July–Aug. 1991, at 42. 
 80. See sources cited supra note 79. 
 81. Hereafter “CSR” is used to designate corporate social responsibility, corporate 
social responsiveness and corporate performance collectively. 
 82. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: 
A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 
767 (2005); cf. Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1587 (1993) (arguing that the “policies underlying corporate 
law cannot be reduced to a unidimensional value, such as the economic objective of 
‘maximizing shareholders’ wealth.”). 
 83. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 82, at 768–70 (delineating the parameters of the  
debate about the broader role of the corporations). 
 84. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264 (1992). 
 85. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of 
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 825–26 (1999); Michael 
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 779, 782–84 (2006); see also JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETHICS IN FINANCE 176, 193 (1999). 
 86. David S. Allen, The First Amendment and the Doctrine of Corporate Person-
hood: Collapsing the Press-Corporation Distinction, 2 JOURNALISM 255, 259–260 
(2001). 
 87. See Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 825; Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in 
Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 294 (1998). 
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to the firm are entitled to legal recognition of their residual interest in the 
assets of the enterprise.88 
In addition, CSR advocates challenge narrow economics-based justifi-
cations for the stockholder-centered view, asserting that the ideal of cor-
porate efficiency carries a broader meaning than elevated stock prices.89 
Accordingly, CSR-oriented theorists have generally repudiated the type 
of cost-benefit analysis that ignores and segregates distributive consider-
ations from conventional notions of profit-maximizing efficiency. 90  
Because a corporation’s existence depends on sophisticated financial 
transactions, contracts, managers, employees, and other relationships 
among investors, it functions as a semi-public enterprise.91 However, this 
view is not universally shared among corporate governance scholars.92 
Consequently, CSR’s main tenets have highlighted corporate stake-
holders’ interests. They have recognized that firms’ constituencies play 
similarly active roles in corporate conduct and strategy. 93  Moreover,  
                                                                                                             
 88. E.g., Greenfield, supra note 87, at 304. Scholarly commentary has also focused 
on the property rights justifications for the notion of the shareholder primacy. See Oliver 
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 
1119 (1990). See generally Allen, supra note 84, at 270. 
 89. See generally Kent Greenfield, There’s a Forest in Those Trees: Teaching About 
the Role of Corporations in Society, 34 GA. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (2000); Ronen Shamir, 
The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded Morality, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 1, 1 
(2008). 
 90. See generally Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 87, 117 (2005); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework 
for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 590 (1992). 
 91. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS 
AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 29 (2006). See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. 
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 247 (1999) 
(building upon the presumption that corporate managers owe a duty beyond that which 
they owe to the shareholders). 
 92. For example, corporate law professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman 
argue that “the recent dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology of corporate law 
among the business, government, and legal elites in key commercial jurisdictions” has 
left no serious contenders to this view of a corporation. Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001); see 
also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence 
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 650 (1999); Ro-
nald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 333 (2001). For a critique of Hansmann’s and Kraakman’s pos-
ition decrying their perspective as “Americanocentric,” see Douglas M. Branson, The 
Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 331 (2001). 
 93. See FREEMAN, supra note 29, at 24–25. See generally Thomas Donaldson & Lee 
E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Imp-
lications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 65–66 (1995). 
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recent scholarly literature illustrates that conventional approaches to cor-
porate governance are changing due to concerns facing management of 
multinational firms.94 These changes have led to economic analysis of 
managerial incentives for undertaking corporate social responsibility,95 
fiduciary duties, 96  stakeholder-oriented management strategies, 97  and 
pro-CSR activism by corporate boards and their shareholders.98 The in-
quiry also highlights quantitative metrics of ratings, reporting practices, 
and indexes that relate to corporate responsibility governance.99 In addi-
tion, new methods have been suggested for allowing enhanced participa-
tion on the part of boards of directors.100 Greater inclusion on a board 
will foster a stronger connection between corporate accountability and 
governance.101 
                                                                                                             
 94. See, e.g., Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram, & James P. 
Walsh, The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: 
Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, at 9, 9. 
 95. See generally Craig Mackenzie, Boards, Incentives and Corporate Social  
Responsibility: The Case for a Change of Emphasis, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 
935, 935 (2007). 
 96. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are 
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1600–01 (2005). 
 97. See Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram, & Walsh, supra note 94, at 28–29; see also 
Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate 
Governance at the End of History, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 109, 110. 
 98. See, e.g., Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”: 
Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 754 
(2003); see also Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, a Prod and a Big Stick: 
An Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as 
Methods for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 938 (2005). 
 99. See Craig Deegan, The Legitimizing Effect of Social and Environmental Disclo-
sures: A Theoretical Foundation, 15 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 282, 283–86 
(2002); see also Reggy Hooghiemstra, Corporate Communication and Impression Man-
agement: New Perspectives Why Companies Engage in Social Reporting, 27 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 55, 55 (2000); Ans Kolk, Sustainability, Accountability and Corporate Gover-
nance: Exploring Multinationals’ Reporting Practices, 18 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T. 1, 3 
(2008). 
 100. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Board as a Path Toward Corporate 
Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 279, 302 (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom 
Campbell eds., 2007) (proposing several remedial measures). 
 101. See Arthur R. Pinto, Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate  
Governance, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 477, 479 (2005). See generally YADONG LUO, GLOBAL 
DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 131 (2007). 
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II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GLOBALLY 
From the standpoint of global corporate governance, the discussion  
regarding corporate social responsibility, corporate social responsive-
ness, and corporate social performance is reduced to a debate about what 
may be termed a monophonic versus a polyphonic102 view of corporate 
objectives. For years, assuming various labels, the debate between the 
monophonic and polyphonic camps has encompassed business ethics,  
management, corporate law, and corporate governance theories.103 The 
debate has focused predominately on the behavior of domestic, rather 
than multinational, business enterprises.104 It has thus centered on inter-
pretations of domestic corporate law (e.g., U.S. corporate law).105 As the 
following discussion demonstrates, the monophonic-polyphonic contro-
versy—either in a local or global context—aims to explain what form of 
governance would fulfill the obligations of corporate social responsibility 
while moving beyond the narrow goal of shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion.106 
                                                                                                             
 102. The author uses the terms by way of analogy to music. In musical composition, 
polyphony (derived from the Greek words for “many” and “voice”) refers to a texture 
made up of two or more independent melodic voices. By contrast, monophony refers to 
music composed with only a single voice. BARBARA RUSSANO HANNING, CONCISE 
HISTORY OF WESTERN MUSIC 44 (1st ed. 1998). Accordingly, a monophonic orientation in 
global corporate governance is characterized by its concern for the single voice of share-
holders, while a polyphonic orientation seeks to orchestrate a plurality of stakeholder 
voices. 
 103. Depending on disciplinary context, the various designations have included: 
“communitarian versus contractarian,” “Berle versus Dodd debate,” “shareholder para-
dox,” “separation fallacy,” “separation thesis,” and “monotonic versus pluralist” and 
“unidimensional versus multidimensional.” 
 104. But see Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global 
Environment: A Search for the Best of all Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 829, 838–
42 (2000) (arguing that differing corporate governance structures in Europe, Japan, and 
the United States restrict the extent to which transnational firms may permit stakeholder 
influences). 
 105. Curiously, the same conflict is embodied in the Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, which sets out a legal framework for the organization and operation 
of private stock enterprises. See Michael Irl Nikkel, Note, “Chinese Characteristics” in 
Corporate Clothing: Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China’s Company Law, 80 MINN. L. 
REV. 503, 523 (1995) (Whereas Article 102 states that shareholders “shall be the organ of 
authority” of the firm, Article 14 maintains that business enterprises must “strengthen the 
establishment of a socialist spiritual civilization, and accept the supervision of the gov-
ernment and the public.”). 
 106. See Orts, supra note 82, at 1587. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The 
“Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 407 
(1989); Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corpo-
rate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1409 (1993); Lyman Johnson, The  
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A. Monophonic Governance Model 
Over the years, the debate over the nature and purpose of the corporate 
enterprise has lingered and has sought to apportion priority between 
shareholder and nonshareholder interests. 107  In the United States, the  
debate extends back to the landmark case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Com-
pany,108 where the court held that a business corporation is organized 
primarily for the profit of its stockholders, rather than for its employees 
or the community.109 The debate then poured into academia. Whereas 
Adolf Berle advocated the stockholder-centric view, E. Merrick Dodd 
urged increased consideration for nonstockholders.110 
For a considerable time, the prevailing corporate governance paradigm 
was dominated by the monophonic perspective, which emphasizes the 
stockholder-centric approach to corporate governance.111 Consequently, 
                                                                                                             
Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. 
REV. 865, 865 (1990); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 
223 (1991); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 210 (1990); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique 
of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 856 (1997)  
(reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)). 
 107. See Judd F. Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good: Leveraging Due Care for Bet-
ter, More Socially Responsible Corporate DecisionMaking, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. 
REV. 438, 439–40 (2007). 
 108. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 109. Id. The Dodge Court reasoned: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of 
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. 
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain 
that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of 
profits or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to de-
vote them to other purposes. 
Id. Later, the debate resurfaced in the context of corporate mergers and acquisitions dur-
ing the 1980s. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the interests of non-shareholders 
could be taken into account by managers and directors when assessing the implications of 
the takeover bids. Cf. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 
1985) (finding a duty to evaluate the threat to the corporate enterprise as a whole). 
 110. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1365, 1365–66 (1932); see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers 
in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are  
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1145–53 (1932); A. A. Sommer, 
Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years 
Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 36–38 (1991); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of  
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 77–89, 89 n.4 (2002). 
 111. See BOATRIGHT, supra note 85, at 194. 
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corporate governance was focused mainly on the board’s structure, its 
functions, and its relations with other corporate organs, and the emphasis 
was on profit maximization.112 This governance model was heavily influ-
enced by both Berle’s and Means’s analyses of principal-agent problems 
arising from separating stockholders’ ownership rights from corporate 
managerial duties.113 The business community relies on corporate law to 
influence management so as to reduce such agency-cost problems.114 
This enables shareholders to trust managers with their investments.115 
With an emphasis on resolving agency conflicts, the monophonic corpo-
rate governance paradigm embraced a view of economic efficiency116 
that favored cost-benefit analysis and value-maximization objectives in 
business decision-making.117 But it typically ignored adverse social and 
environmental externalities, downplayed the stakeholders’ interests,118 
and disregarded firms’ obligations to nonshareholders.119 
Milton Friedman advocated an extreme version of the monophonic 
view for promoting a free-market economy: 
In such an economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to in-
crease its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which 
                                                                                                             
 112. Id. at 172. 
 113. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 125–26 (rev. ed. 1967). 
 114. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strate-
gies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 21, 21 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976); see 
also Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a Corporation: An Introduc-
tion, 24 J. CORP. L. 807, 808–09 (1999); cf. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy 
Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 279 (1998). 
 117. See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: 
Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1155–56 (1985); see also FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW  
4–5, 17, 38, 70 (1991). 
 118. See LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH 
483 (2005). 
 119. See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and 
Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 
398 (1993); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 70. See generally  
Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A 
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423–25 (1993). 
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is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or 
fraud.120 
This view emphasizes competition to maximize the bottom line. This 
approach, called the “separation thesis” by some, is antithetic to the view 
that economic value may flow from a firm’s commitment to social re-
sponsibility.121  Business managers view economics and ethics as two 
mutually exclusive spheres.122 From the monophonic standpoint, “social 
responsibility” possesses three key defects. First, it expresses a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the essence of a free market.123 Second, it 
mistakenly allows the interests of groups other than shareholders to  
constrain, rather than expand, corporate activities.124 Third, it does not 
provide evidence of any economic benefits from investing in social initi-
atives.125 This position suggests a single argument for legal and ethical 
compliance; namely, to sidestep the monetary costs of noncompliance.126 
Accordingly, the monophonic view of corporate governance leads to 
reactive compliance with environmental and human rights standards but 
only insofar as these norms are grounded in the “hard” rule of law.127 
That is, under the monophonic view, corporations comply only when 
noncompliance threatens sanctions pursuant to the “hard” rule of law. 
The monophonic view is hardwired to legal accountability (legal norms 
                                                                                                             
 120. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 133; see also Willa Johnson, Freedom and  
Philanthropy: An Interview with Milton Friedman, 71 BUS. & SOC. REV. 11, 14 (1989). 
Friedman also offered this decidedly monophonic account of corporate governance: 
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backed by hard sanctions) and fiscal accountability to stockholders, inso-
far as this is mandated by corporate law.128 
B. Polyphonic Governance Model 
Whereas the monophonic model is addressed to matters of agency, the 
polyphonic model focuses on ethics and accountability to parties outside 
the firm. 129  Under the polyphonic approach, maximizing profits for 
shareholders is not the sole purpose of a business.130 Polyphonic corpo-
rate governance seeks to link relationships among various parties together 
with a broadly defined corporate mission.131 This model sees businesses as 
fulfilling various functions within a society.132 Here, businesses serve an 
array of other constituents.133 Thus, the scope of social responsibility ex-
tends beyond merely meeting the bottom line, and business firms’ ethical 
and discretionary responsibilities go beyond their purely economic and 
legal objectives.134 Nevertheless, the monophonic view retains the basic 
assumption that corporations are fundamentally profit-making enterpris-
es.135 Corporations strive to meet the bottom line as it is necessary to  
preserve their economic viability. They are not social welfare agencies. 
Stated differently, managers have an institutional and moral duty to 
broader constituencies to keep the firm profitable. Norman Bowie writes, 
“[N]ot only does Wall Street expect a business rationale for corporate 
good deeds; Wall Street has a moral right to those expectations.”136  
Bowie continues, “This strategy grounds the motive to seek profits in 
ethics itself.”137 The polyphonic view, however, correctly assumes that, 
                                                                                                             
 128. Id. 
 129. See CARROLL & BUCHHOLTZ, supra note 29, at 83–85 (discussing the notion of a 
stakeholder, and what is at stake for stakeholders or those outside of the firm). 
 130. See id. 
 131. See generally Josep M. Lozano, Towards the Relational Corporation: From 
Managing Stakeholder Relationships to Building Stakeholder Relationships (Waiting for 
Copernicus), 5(2) CORP. GOVERNANCE 60, 60 (2005) (discussing relations among stake-
holders and shareholders). 
 132. Cf. Millon, supra note 106, at 225. See generally BOATRIGHT, supra note 63, at 1. 
 133. These constituencies include employees, customers, bondholders, suppliers, dis-
tributors, lenders, creditors, regulators, local communities, state and federal governments, 
special interest groups, the environment, the communities in which the firm operates. See 
FREEMAN, supra note 29, at 25; see also Goodpaster, supra note 29, at 54; McDaniel, 
supra note 29, at 123; David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in 
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1378–79 (1993). 
 134. See CARROLL & BUCHHOLTZ, supra note 29, at 87 (providing a graphical illustration 
of stakeholder view of the firm). 
 135. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 116, at 310. 
 136. See NORMAN E. BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 142 (1999). 
 137. See id. at 142. 
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even in pursuit of profit, corporations must deploy financial, political, 
and social capital in a socially responsible way. Corporate governance 
must seek to confer not only financial benefits to shareholders, but also 
social benefits to all of the firm’s stakeholders.138 
The monophonic perspective, which has been characterized as “corpo-
rate Neanderthalism,”139 fails to account for the fact that, in today’s in-
formation age, corporations are under meticulous observation.140 It fails 
to consider that a watchful public, media, and government will hold mul-
tinational corporations accountable for “corporate Neanderthalism”; it 
ignores firms’ broader social responsibilities; and it ignores the potential 
for firms to incur “ethical blowback” 141  from broader constituencies.  
Robert Solomon, for example, attacks the monophonic model for its “pa-
thetic understanding of stockholder personality as homo economicus.”142 
Whereas Amartya Sen challenges the mindset according to which “busi-
ness principles are taken to be very rudimentary . . . essentially restricted 
. . . to profit maximization, but with a very wide reach [to] . . . all eco-
nomic transactions.”143 
Before turning to the question of whether a polyphonic approach to 
corporate governance provides a satisfactory theoretical anchoring for 
the emerging regime of civil regulations that increasingly characterizes 
global governance, it will be useful to examine an additional approach, 
known as “integrative social contracts theory.” 
C. Integrative Social Contracts Theory (“ISCT”) 
Both corporate social responsiveness and the stakeholder view alike 
are criticized on the ground that they do not provide management with 
precise standards of conduct.144 By itself, the concept of corporate social 
responsiveness falls short of offering normative guidelines for managers 
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to pursue in response to social expectations and demands.145 Likewise, 
stakeholder theory has been faulted for its failure to reconcile the com-
peting interests of various stakeholders.146 
In response to these challenges, Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dun-
fee developed a social contract theory of business.147 The ISCT develops 
two key concepts: hypernorms and moral free space.148 These concepts 
are illustrated by a reference to a series of concentric rings that represent 
core norms accepted by corporations, industries, or economic cultures.149 
Hypernorms, which rest at the center, are norms embodying transcultural 
values fundamental to human existence, such as prescriptions shared by 
main religions around the world and most basic human rights.150 Such 
higher-order norms impose minimal necessary constraints on the capacity 
of communities to formulate their own rules.151 Advancing away from 
the center of the rings, one finds norms which have greater cultural spe-
cificity than those at the center.152 These rules are molded by the social 
norms of sundry economic communities, such as corporations, subunits 
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within firms, industries, professional associations, trade groups, govern-
mental bodies, and so on.153 
The next ring represents moral free space, where one finds norms that 
are inconsistent with at least some other norms embraced by other  
economic communities.154 Within moral free space, members are free to 
establish their own norms for economic conduct. 155  However, such 
norms must have the status of being both “authentic” and “legitimate.”156 
A norm is “authentic” if community members have given their informed 
consent to the norm’s existence while still retaining a right to exit the 
community should they come to disapprove of the norm.157 The existence 
of specific authentic norms is established by empirical conditions ex-
pressing customary acceptance by the relevant economic community.158 
A norm is “legitimate” if it does not run afoul of a hypernorm.159 At 
the outermost ring are illegitimate norms, which are incompatible with 
hypernorms. Donaldson and Dunfee assert that integrative social con-
tracts theory provides a normative core for stakeholder theory.160 Follow-
ing this line of thought entails consulting relevant community norms to 
decide, first, who counts as a stakeholder, and, second, what obligations 
extend from the firm to the stakeholders.161 Conflicts between norms are 
resolved by determining the dominant legitimate norms, which are  
accorded priority.162 
The preceding discussion shows the need for corporations to adapt to 
societal expectations and adopt societal norms. While both CSR and 
stakeholder theory advance the general notion that corporations should 
be attuned to a variety of stakeholders’ demands, social contract theory 
makes a significant contribution beyond those accounts. Social contract 
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theory accords deeper meaning and substance to the notion of CSR by 
fastening it to communal norms.163 The social contract perspective on 
corporate governance provides an explanation for corporations’ accep-
tance of global civil regulations.164 These regulations, as understood in 
ISCT’s terminology, are “extant social contracts”—the product of eco-
nomic communities voluntarily adopting norms within moral free 
space.165 ISCT highlights the normative content of the standards neces-
sary for adopting moral principles. Without definite content—i.e., with-
out a definite mission for corporate governance—stakeholders would 
engage in power-wars over their respective interests.166 CSR scholars and 
ethicists, for instance, consider the human rights and environmental 
norms that are voluntary established by multinational firms to incorporate 
genuine moral obligations that are recognized by worldwide consen-
sus.167 Accordingly, ISCT’s notion of hypernorms accounts substantially 
for the emergence of global civil regulations in the form of “soft” and 
“hard” law. 
D. Corporate Reputational Capital: The Missing Link 
Given its emphasis on the wider society, the rise of civil regulation 
should lead corporate governance to embrace the polyphonic view. Para-
doxically, however, its rise has not diminished the importance global 
companies attach to the monophonic model.168 Nevertheless, as many 
global companies have discovered, there is evidence that commitment to 
responsible global corporate citizenship comes with financial advantag-
es.169 The rise of civil regulations, therefore, begs the question whether 
corporate governance can effectively synchronize the monophonic and 
polyphonic viewpoints. When corporate governance, in an effort to 
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stockpile reputational capital, begins to maximize shareholder wealth by 
properly accommodating various stakeholders’ interests, synchronization 
may be attained.170 In other words, reputational capital provides a miss-
ing link in global governance. The notion of reputational capital recog-
nizes that the volume and breadth of social expectations are increasing. 
The ISCT provides the theoretical foundation. When micro-social  
contracts are breached, the breaches cause direct reputational harm and 
diminish corporate “reputational assets.” 171  When the “contracts” are 
“performed,” the firm’s reputational capital grows.172 
The concept of reputational capital emerged in tandem with the ideal 
of free-market capitalism, which has been modified with the advent of 
civil society’s focus on CSR.173 Reputational capital may prove to be 
indispensible for modern corporate managers. It illuminates how manag-
ers should commit to CSR to preserve and build a firm’s intangible repu-
tational assets.174 Managers’ commitment to CSR is further buttressed by 
the emerging corpus of global civil regulations.175 Simply put, the “sanc-
tion” for noncompliance with civil standards translates into reputational 
loss. The “reward” for honoring the standards is reputational gain.  
Accordingly, the emerging “accountability regimes” sanction corpora-
tions for breaches of their CSR. 
III. THE REGIME OF GLOBAL CIVIL REGULATIONS 
I now turn to the emergence of a global governance regime that  
primarily stands for civil business regulation, or “soft law.” Civil regula-
tions utilize private, nonstate, and market-based regulatory regimes to 
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govern multinational enterprises and their global supply networks. 176 
They regulate the impact multinational companies and markets have on 
human rights practices, labor conditions, environmental sustainability, 
and community development, particularly in less developed countries.177 
In the past, businesses and their leaders sought to cure social ills at the 
local level through philanthropic initiatives.178 Unlike local community 
philanthropy, however, CSR has become increasingly transnational in its 
reach due to the social contract for multinational business.179 
A. Background on Civil Regulations 
Along with the growth of CSR, a surge of public interest advocacy, 
spearheaded by nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) and regula-
tors, calls for the introduction of enforceable instruments to support su-
pervision of social responsibility and corporate accountability.180 Among 
the mechanisms to be employed are public monitoring campaigns and 
litigation targeting multinational enterprises over human rights and 
workplace violations, as well as promulgation of “soft” law norms.181 
The goal is to increase businesses’ involvement with CSR.182 To that 
aim, civil society groups step in to pressure businesses and hold them 
accountable.183 
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Civil regulations differ from customary methods of business self-
regulation in several ways. First, the regulations promote a variety of 
public interests, not just the interests of companies or industries. 184 
Second, unlike established modes of business self-regulation, civil regu-
lations arise in reaction to the society’s expectations with respect to busi-
nesses.185  Society’s expectations, in turn, are driven by activists who  
expose corporations’ breaches of their CSR, or, in terms of the ISCT, 
breaches of the “terms” of the social contract.186 Finally, unlike conven-
tional business self-regulation, civil regulation is more apt to engage 
nonbusiness constituents in processes that are pertinent to civil society.187 
In sum, the regulations establish nonstate mechanisms for governing 
transnational companies and markets.188 
1. The Global Public Domain 
The growth of global civil regulation serves as an interface between 
multinational corporations and private governance. The rise of such regu-
lation is connected to the emergence of a new global public domain.189 
Comprised of both private and public participants, the global public do-
main is a forum for discussion, debate, and activism regarding the crea-
tion of “global public goods.”190 In the context of global environmental 
and social responsibility, cooperation between multinationals and civil 
society institutions presupposes delineation of the scope of those respon-
sibilities.191 Many of the entities comprising the global public domain are 
NGOs. 192  NGOs are mainly headquartered in North America and  
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Europe.193 They scrutinize and try to gain sway over an array of transna-
tional business practices.194 There are, however, other actors in the global 
public domain that exert influence on corporate accountability. Consum-
er organizations, environmental and sustainability groups, human rights 
advocates, labor unions, religious affiliations, student associations, social 
and ethical funds, and socially oriented institutional investors, are all part 
of the global public domain.195 
2. Scope and Magnitude of the Regulations 
The quantity and span of global civil regulations grew substantially 
throughout the 1990s.196 Private regulations that specify standards for 
responsible business conduct are in place for nearly all global industry 
sectors and internationally traded products or services. 197  Currently,  
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approximately 300 products or industry codes are enacted.198 Many of 
these codes speak to environmental or employment practices.199 Multiple 
codes regulate a significant number of different products and sectors.200 
Many companies periodically report their environmental and social prac-
tices.201 A large number of these companies have formulated their own 
codes while also subscribing to additional industry and cross-industry 
codes of conduct.202 For example, The United Nations Global Compact, 
which is the biggest private business code, boasts over 3,500 corporate 
signatories, spanning six continents. 203  The number of major global  
financial institutions signing the United Nations Principles for Responsi-
ble Investment more than doubled to reach 381 in 2008, representing 
assets of $14 trillion.204 
As previously noted, the growth of civil regulations has resulted from 
civil society’s increased expectations for CSR. 205  Self-regulation and  
voluntary compliance 206  have grown up within the global business 
framework.207 A variety of self-regulation tools are available to assist 
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submit a letter of intent from the CEO and consent to publish in annual reports or similar 
communications an account of the ways they are lending support for the Compact. Id. 
The objective is to merge principles of the Compact into a company’s business culture, 
strategy, and day-to-day undertakings. Id. 
 204. Press Release, U.N. Global Compact, Principles for Sustainable Development 
(June 17, 2005), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/newsandevents/news_ 
archives/2008_06_17a.html. 
 205. See generally Ruggie, supra note 55, at 499–531. 
 206. See ZADEK, supra note 25, at 122. 
 207. Voluntary compliance takes various forms, but they are mainly best practices, 
codes of conduct, environmental and social management systems, performance standards, 
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firms in their commitments to corporate social responsibility.208 As the 
discussion below illustrates, these tools are used within the context of 
accountability regimes, which are principally linked to the firms’ reputa-
tions. Thus in the context of reputational capital, the private sector is 
equipped with instrument to manage and regulate business conduct. This 
regulation seeks to reduce the degree of environmental and social risk 
that firms’ actions otherwise cause. 
B. Characteristics of Civil Regulations 
Unlike traditional top-to-bottom relations established by governmental 
authority, no clearly established hierarchy exists among the various 
agents exerting influence on international commercial society within 
transnational civil regulation.209 For the past several decades, globaliza-
tion has transformed the landscape of international civil and business 
regulations.210 The polyphonic view has finally caught up with corporate 
                                                                                                             
labeling and certification schemes, rating agencies, sustainable monitoring, reporting 
transparency, and disclosure guidelines. Barricades and Boardrooms, supra note 49, at 
27–30. 
 208. See EU Green Paper, supra note 48, at 6. 
 209. See Ronnie D. Lipschutz, supra note 191, at 259, 261. Nevertheless, significant 
connections remain between civil regulations and conventional ‘hard’ legal regimes. See 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards 
Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 48 
(Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009). For example, civil regulations adopted by 
private enterprise tend to incorporate host countries’ domestic legal norms. See id. at 49. 
Moreover, many private regulatory initiatives result from regulatory standards promul-
gated by intergovernmental organizations, such as the International Finance Corporation 
of the World Bank, the International Labor Organization, and the Organization for  
Economic Cooperation and Development. Id. at 44. Further, the United Nations and the 
European Union, along with the governments of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, and the United States, have all been involved in promoting the establish-
ment of global industry codes of conduct. See K. J. Holsti, Governance Without Govern-
ment: Polyarchy in Nineteenth-Century European International Politics, in GOVERNANCE 
WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 30, 55–56 (James N. 
Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992). 
 210. See Thomas J. Biersteker, The “Triumph” of Neoclassical Economics in the De-
veloping World, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN 
WORLD POLITICS, 102, 110–11 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992); 
Rosenau, supra note 4, at 13; Scholte, supra note 20, at 15–23; cf. ROBERT W. COX, 
Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for Europe, in APPROACHES TO 
WORLD ORDER 237 (1996) (examining diminishing political authority of the European 
nation-states who are members of the European Union and its impact on its regulatory 
landscape). 
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governance.211 That, together with the advent of CSR, reveals the private 
sector’s intensifying influence on public policy and regulation.212 Scho-
lars have noted that the regulatory power of the state is undergoing  
extensive decentralization under the influence of globalization.213 Accor-
dingly, blends of state and market, public and private, and traditional and 
self-regulatory institutional structures, characterized by alliances built 
among nation-states, NGOs, and business enterprises, are replacing the 
traditional mode of top-to-bottom hierarchical regulation.214 
Public policy once created and enforced through official regulatory  
organs, such as environmental boards and employment nondiscrimina-
tion panels, is being handled by means of dialogue, negotiation, and co-
operation between the public and private sectors.215 Consequently, global 
business regulatory instruments are undergoing transformation.216 Global 
business regulation is no longer restricted to administrative and legisla-
tive activity.217 It encompasses market-oriented agents that impose busi-
ness disclosure, monitoring, reporting, and transparency requirements, 
backed with reputational sanctions to address business misconduct.218 
                                                                                                             
 211. Cf. Knill & Lehmkuhl, supra note 11, at 44–45. See generally R. Edward Free-
man, Andrew C. Wicks & Bidhan Parmar, Stakeholder Theory and the “Corporate  
Objective Revisited”, 15 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 364, 364 (2004); R. Edward Freeman, 
supra note 121, at 409–22. 
 212. See Lester M. Salaman, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An 
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 8, 
11–14 (Lester M. Salamon & Odus V. Elliott eds., 2002). 
 213. Cf. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations: 
An Experimental Approach, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 165–92 (2008) (concluding that 
social and cultural norms dominate state regulation and its policy-making as far as civil 
enforcement). 
 214. See generally Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 498, 498 (2004) (discussing employment disputes, organizational com-
pliance, financial regulation, and employee misconduct). 
 215. See, e.g., David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The 
Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS 
Q. 453, 455 (2007); see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the 
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 371–76 
(2004). 
 216. See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law 55 S. 
ECON. J. 644, 658 (1989). 
 217. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 9, at 110; LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW 
MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 39 (1983) (delineating historical  
development of transnational business litigation); see also supra text accompanying note 9. 
 218. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 213, at 165 (2008). 
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C. The “Triangular” Nature of Authority  
Civil regulation is comprised of market-based, nonstate, and private 
regulatory structures.219 These components govern the behavior of trans-
national enterprises along with their global supply networks.220 One of 
the chief characteristics of civil regulation is that its enforcement, gover-
nance, and legitimacy do not rest on traditional institutions of public  
authority.221 Whereas, traditionally, corporate governance was shaped by 
substantive law promulgated by governmental authority, today’s transna-
tional businesses function within a new slate of authorities.222 Areas of 
authority traditionally reserved to government are now shared with  
nonstate authorities.223 
Civil regulations ordinarily function alongside nation-states, not from 
within.224 Thus, as opposed to hard law, civil regulations are the product 
of “soft law,” or private law, rather than of nation-states’ legally enforce-
able norms.225 In that sense, companies subject to a multitude of civil 
regulations face reputational rather than legal penalties.226 The advent of 
soft-law’s regulatory influence outside nations’ regulatory schemes has 
empowered transnational nonstate actors.227 The result is that the private 
sector has a much more prominent public role, and private authorities 
have a growing role in transnational economic regulation.228 Corpora-
tions increasingly form a part of an emerging global public domain. Civil 
regulations, however, do not supplant nation-states. Instead, they institute 
                                                                                                             
 219. Cutler, Haufler & Porter, supra note 4, at 3; see Scholte, supra note 20, at 19. 
 220. See sources cited supra note 219. 
 221. See sources cited supra note 219. 
 222. See Cutler, Haufler & Porter, supra note 4, at 4–18; Scholte, supra note 20, at 
19. 
 223. See ROBERT W. COX, Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for 
Europe, in APPROACHES TO WORLD ORDER 237, 237 (1996) (discussing the shift of  
authority away from the states in the European Union). 
 224. See Virginia Haufler, Globalization and Industry Self-Regulation, in GOVERNANCE 
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION 226, 226 (Miles Kahler & 
David A. Lake eds., 2003). 
 225. See id. at 226–27. 
 226. See John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilock, Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft 
Law in Sustainable Global Commerce, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY 
STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 3, 6, 11 (John J. 
Kirton & Michael J. Trebilock eds., 2004). See generally SOFT LAW IN GOVERNANCE AND 
REGULATION (Ulrika Moth ed., 2004); Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft 
Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 434–50 (2000). 
 227. See Haufler, supra note 224, at 226–27. 
 228. See VIRGINIA HAUFLER, THE PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY 
SELF-REGULATION, IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 12–15 (2001); see also Hall & Biersteker, 
supra note 4, at 3– 4. 
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governance systems within wider global structures of “social capacity 
and agency” where none existed before.229 The advent of civil regulation 
spells the emergence of what some scholars term a global “governance 
triangle,” wherein nation-states are but a single source of global regulato-
ry authority.230 
The notion of governance without government made its debut in the 
scholarly literature during the 1990s.231 Its debut, precipitated by eco-
nomic globalization, highlighted the changes that globalization caused in 
the governance structure of international society.232  The term “gover-
nance” came to be used to refer to self-organizing systems that stand 
alongside the hierarchies and markets that comprise government struc-
tures.233 Global governance, in turn, refers to the expansion of the sphere 
of influence of governing structures to entities beyond nation-states that 
do not possess sovereign authority.234 Governance and government are in 
fact two logically distinct notions. Governance connotes a process 
founded on absence of centralized international governmental authority. 
Ideally, “global governance” undertakes the role within the international 
realm that governments assume within the nation-state.235 
D. Forms of Civil Regulations 
The growth of corporate social responsibility reveals the emergence of 
novel global governance mechanisms and business civil regulations.236 
Global companies are deploying a variety of devices to propagate prin-
ciples for responsible business conduct.237 These may be categorized as 
follows: (1) self-regulation—voluntary mechanisms taken on individually 
in the market; (2) inter-firm cooperation—voluntary tools established 
                                                                                                             
 229. See Ruggie, supra note 55, at 519. 
 230. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 209, at 44–50. 
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POL. STUD. 652, 660 (1996). 
 234. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, What is Global Governance?, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
367, 369 (1995). 
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Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992). 
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cooperatively between firms and business associations; and (3) co-
regulation and multi-stakeholder partnerships—voluntary mechanisms 
developed collaboratively with other entities, such as public-private and 
hybrid partnerships (governments, international organizations, NGOs, 
trade unions, and governments).238 
1. Voluntary Self-Regulation 
Numerous large, global companies institute their own codes of conduct 
that aim to regulate their operations worldwide.239 One example of vol-
untary self-regulation is the Leon Sullivan Foundation’s promulgation of 
the Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility (the “Principles”) 
in 1999.240 The Principles encompass a breadth of CSR concerns, such 
as: employee freedom of association, health and environmental stan-
dards, and sustainable development.241 Fortune 500 companies are now 
motivated to adjust their internal practices to comply with the standards 
found within the Principles.242 
                                                                                                             
 238. See id. at 435–36. 
 239. See, e.g., Gene R. Laczniak & Jacob Naor, Global Ethics: Wrestling with the 
Corporate Conscience, BUS., July—Sept. 1985, at 7 (discussing the examples of Allis 
Chalmers, Caterpillar Tractor, Chiquita Brands International, Medtronic, and S.C. John-
son). While there are firms that do not have comprehensive codes addressing their inter-
national operations, many adopt codes that include sections that speak to foreign practices. 
Id. For instance, Northrop Grumman Corporation’s “Standards of Business Conduct” con-
tains an “International” segment. Northrop Grumman Corporation, Standards of Business 
Conduct, at 10, http://www.northropgrumman.com/pdf/noc_standards_conduct.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2009). The section reads, in relevant part: 
Employees and consultants or agents representing the company abroad or 
working on international business in the United States should be aware that the 
company’s Values and Standards of Conduct apply to them anywhere in the 
world. Less than strict adherence to laws and regulations that apply to the com-
pany’s conduct of international business would be considered a compromise of 
our Values and Standards of Conduct. 
Id. 
 240. See The Sullivan Foundation, The Global Sullivan Principles, http://www. 
thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/principles/gsp/default.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2009). 
 241. The objectives of the Principles are to support economic, social, and political 
justice by firms wherever they conduct operations; to advance human rights and to pro-
mote equality of opportunity at all levels of employment, including racial and gender 
diversity on decision-making committees and boards; and to train and advance disadvan-
taged workers for technical, supervisory, and management opportunities. Id. 
 242. See, e.g., Gordon Leslie Clark & Tessa Hebb, Why Do They Care? The Market 
for Corporate Global Responsibility and the Role of Institutional Investors 17–23 (June 
16, 2004) (unpublished paper presented at the Using Pensions for Social Control of Capi-
talist Investment conference, available at http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/ 
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In 2005, the Global Business Standards (“GBS”) Codex was published 
by a group of scholars.243 Intended “as a benchmark for [firms] wishing 
to create their own world-class code,” the GBS Codex set forth eight 
principles shared by five well-known codes that are embraced by the 
world’s largest companies.244 Incorporated in the principles were stan-
dards in the following categories: citizenship, dignity, fairness, fiduciary, 
property, reliability, responsiveness, and transparency. 245  Individual  
corporate codes of conduct usually contain an amalgamation of prudential, 
technical, and moral norms, declared as general principles. 246  Critics 
point to the various codes’ failures to include enforcement sanctions and 
failures to emphasize profit maximization.247  Yet corporations increa-
singly specify criteria such as “profitability” and “shareholder interests” 
in their mission statements.248 Nevertheless, they also affirm that corpo-
rate responsibility for “stakeholder interests” means considering both 
community interests and sustainability.249 
                                                                                                             
articles-publications/state-local/paper-clark.pdf) (noting that CalPERS’ may withhold 
investment in companies that do not meet the Sullivan Principles, thus creating the risk of 
reputational harm). 
 243. See Lynn Paine, Rohit Deshpandé, Joshua D. Margolis & Kim Eric Bettcher, Up 
to Code: Does Your Company’s Conduct Meet World-Class Standards?, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Dec. 2005, at 122. 
 244. Id. at 124–25. 
 245. See id. at 125. 
 246. See generally GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 
(Oliver F. Williams ed., 2000); RAYMOND J. WALDMANN, REGULATING INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS THROUGH CODES OF CONDUCT 21 (1980). 
 247. WALDMANN, supra note 246, at 65 (discussing the need to emphasize profit); 
James E. Post, Global Codes of Conduct: Activists, Lawyers, and Managers in Search of 
a Solution, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 103, 
111(Oliver F. Williams ed., 2000) (expanding on the lack of enforcement criticism). 
 248. Broadhurst, supra note 42, at 89. 
 249. The credo of Johnson & Johnson, for instance, is particularly noteworthy: 
  We believe our first responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and patients, to 
mothers and fathers and all others who use our products and services. In meet-
ing their needs everything we do must be of high quality. We must constantly 
strive to reduce our costs in order to maintain reasonable prices. Customers’ 
orders must be serviced promptly and accurately. Our suppliers and distributors 
must have an opportunity to make a fair profit. 
  We are responsible to our employees, the men and women who work with us 
throughout the world. Everyone must be considered as an individual. We must 
respect their dignity and recognize their merit. They must have a sense of secu-
rity in their jobs. Compensation must be fair and adequate, and working condi-
tions clean, orderly and safe. We must be mindful of ways to help our em-
ployees fulfill their family responsibilities. Employees must feel free to make 
suggestions and complaints. There must be equal opportunity for employment, 
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2. Inter-Firm and Cross-Industry Cooperation 
As key agents in the global economy, transnational firms wield enorm-
ous clout to influence economic activities. 250  Firms utilize various  
instruments to influence global civil society. Among the more significant 
mechanisms are inter-firm and cross-industry cooperative instruments.251 
These instruments are developed through CSR business associations,252 
which formulate strategies for concerted action in the form of self-
regulating proposals within the private sector.253 These nongovernmental 
associations of businesses promote the dissemination of best business 
practices.254 They seek to establish universal, uniform standards to com-
bat a wide range of practices including apartheid, conflicts of interest, 
deception, discrimination, embezzlement, executive compensation, fraud, 
forgery, genocide, insider trading, the misuse of pension funds, slavery, 
theft, and corruption.255 Business associations serve as forums for corpo-
                                                                                                             
development and advancement for those qualified. We must provide competent 
management, and their actions must be just and ethical. 
  We are responsible to the communities in which we live and work and to the 
world community as well. We must be good citizens—support good works and 
charities and bear our fair share of taxes. We must encourage civic improve-
ments and better health and education. We must maintain in good order the 
property we are privileged to use, protecting the environment and natural  
resources. 
  Our final responsibility is to our stockholders. Business must make a sound 
profit. We must experiment with new ideas. Research must be carried on, inno-
vative programs developed and mistakes paid for. New equipment must be pur-
chased, new facilities provided and new products launched. Reserves must be 
created to provide for adverse times. When we operate according to these prin-
ciples, the stockholders should realize a fair return. 
Johnson & Johnson, Our Credo, http://www.jnj.com/wps/wcm/connect/c7933f004f5563 
df9e22be1bb31559c7/our-credo.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last visited Sept. 13, 2009). 
 250. Cutler, Haufler & Porter, supra note 4, at 6. 
 251. See Albareda, supra note 237, at 435–36. 
 252. See id. at 434. 
 253. Such business associations include: Business in the Community, Business for 
Social Responsibility, Caux Round Table, CSR Europe, Forum Empresa, International 
Business Leaders Forum, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 
 254. For example, Business for Social Responsibility runs programs including business 
ethics, the workplace, the marketplace, the community, the environment, and the global 
economy. See BSR, How We Work, http://www.bsr.org/about/how-we-work.cfm (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2009). 
 255. For example, the Caux Round Table, headquartered in Switzerland, has adopted 
an international code for multinational firms in Europe, North America, and Japan. The 
Code identifies five basic principles which, as statements of aspirations for business lead-
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rate leaders to discuss and agree on a CSR plan. This entails creation of 
consolidated private rules, standards, and management instruments, all in 
the absence of legally enforceable “hard” sanctions.256 The associations 
often serve as a means for collective exertion of pressure, in order, for 
instance, to defend the corporations’ positions before national govern-
ments and international organizations, such as the European Union and 
the United Nations.257 As such, business associations serve as an inter-
face between public and private authorities.258 
Joining cooperative regulations is a wise business tactic for companies 
whose social or environmental practices have been targeted by activists. 
Whereas implementing higher environmental or social standards normal-
ly increases costs, attracting the competition to follow suit levels the 
playing field.259 At least in theory, industry and cross-industry standards 
inhibit companies from competing with each other. In their absence, 
firms would engage in a “race to the bottom” by adopting less rigorous 
protections for employees or the environment.260 Similarly, civil regula-
tions help companies to assist each other in establishing best practices.261 
They also assist with communication and implementation of operational 
upgrades recommended by civil society.262 It is noteworthy that NGOs’ 
participation in civil regulations accords a higher degree of legitimacy 
than obtained by codes of conduct authored by individual companies.263 
                                                                                                             
ers worldwide, extend far beyond those embodied in earlier codes. The principles cover: 
1) stakeholder responsibility, 2) social justice, 3) mutual support, 4) environmental  
concern and 5) avoidance of illicit operations and corrupt practices. Caux Round Table, 
Principles For Business, http://www.cauxroundtable.org/index.cfm?&menuid=8 (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2009). 
 256. See Albareda, supra note 237, at 433. 
 257. For example, the “WBCSD defended a voluntary approach before the United 
Nations; CSR Europe did the same before the European Commission, [the executive 
branch of the European Union], and individual European governments, and BSR has 
done the the same with the United States government.” Id. at 435. 
 258. Although typically underwritten by corporate contributions, inter-firm initiatives 
sometimes obtain financial backing from international organizations. Id. at 436 (noting 
contributions from European Union, various national governments, and the United States). 
 259. See Sethi & Sama, supra note 169, at 89. 
 260. Debora Spar & David Yaffe, Multinational Enterprises and the Prospects for 
Justice, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 557, 557 (1999). 
 261. See Broadhurst, supra note 42, at 95–96. 
 262. See id. at 97. 
 263. See Dara O’Rourke, Market Movements: Nongovernmental Organization Strate-
gies to Influence Global Production and Consumption,  J. INDUS. ECOLOGY, Winter/ 
Spring 2005, at 115, 122; see also Sethi & Linda, supra note 169, at 99–100. 
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This partnership increases the credibility of a company’s commitments to 
corporate social responsibility.264 
Moreover, transnational enterprises often follow their industry peers to 
implement comparable procedures and norms.265 This “follow the leader” 
dynamic spreads managerial protocols, global CSR undertakings being 
among them.266 Hence, if an industry leader consents to a code of prac-
tices, its industry peers typically follow suit.267 This trend also works 
across sectors.268 Indeed, the rise of civil regulations among global com-
panies and industries has provided its own impetus as market participants 
wish to avoid losing reputational capital.269 
Lastly, even ill-intended modifications in standards often have a sub-
stantial and lasting impact on business practices.270 CSR-type initiatives 
that originate as mere symbolic gestures or efforts at appeasement may 
well acquire legitimacy among global civil society.271 In today’s increa-
singly transparent global economy, staffing a CSR office, sending out an 
annual CSR report, combining forces with NGOs, signing on to volunta-
ry industry codes, and having a chief reputation officer are all becoming 
standard operating practices for management at global companies that 
attract high visibility.272 
3. Co-regulation and Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships 
Together with self-regulation instruments, transnational firms are in-
creasingly implementing various CSR mechanisms and civil regulations 
geared to a number of collaborative regulatory arrangements.273 They 
arise out of crossbreed devices originating with civil society bodies and 
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business associations.274 One of the motivations for collaborative gover-
nance is the ability to provide public goods through alliances.275 For  
example, some civil regulations and civil regulatory bodies have been 
instituted with the backing of trade unions, inter-state organizations, or 
governments.276 Nevertheless, nation-states have not insisted on enforc-
ing the regulations, which, after all, are not compulsory.277 Instead, states 
have mainly played the role of intermediaries.278 They help companies 
and, in some instances, NGOs and labor unions, to reach a consensus on 
mutual standards.279 Such multi-stakeholder initiatives amount to public-
private systems of co-regulation.280 
Business-NGO cooperative arrangements have emerged over the past 
several years.281 There is a significant variety among these cooperative 
arrangements.282 In addition, an array of regulatory bodies is undertaking 
multi-stakeholder projects such as the Ethical Trading Initiative that 
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seeks to promote compliance with labor guidelines within the context of 
business supply chains.283 
The growth of these arrangements has given corporations a role in 
global public policy networks. 284  Global public policy networks are  
coalitions linking civil society organs, firms, government agencies, inter-
national organizations, NGOs, professional associations, and religious 
groups.285 Companies that join global public policy networks commit to 
dialogue with other stakeholders to devise ethical standards.286 Their ob-
jective is to establish monitoring mechanisms for firms, so as to improve 
accountability.287 The formation of global public policy networks takes 
place on three levels: (1) establishment of standards, (2) development of 
regulatory structures, and (3) creation of assessment and enforcement 
systems.288 
For example, the Global Reporting Initiative is a partnership of the 
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (“CERES”) and 
the United Nations Environmental Program (“UNEP”), linking firms, 
governments, the media, NGOs, and professional associations in order to 
establish uniform reporting standards to assess the organizations’ envi-
ronmental and social impact.289 Signatory firms agree to observe CERES 
principles and to preserve and protect the environment at levels exceed-
ing what local law mandates.290 Every five years, CERES conducts an 
independent audit to certify that signatory companies are in compliance 
with the principles.291 
As for Western NGOs, many of them deem co-regulation initiatives an 
effective way to influence trends in transnational corporate conduct.292 
Altering procurement protocols of corporate giants such as Carrefour, 
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Tesco, and Wal-Mart can obtain more substantial environmental and  
social results than enacting even massive quantities of national regula-
tions.293 Although some NGOs stress strategies that “name and shame” 
multinational corporations, others opt to combine forces with companies 
and industry associations to establish voluntary standards and take an 
active part in their enforcement.294 The NGOs’ forming of coalitions with 
transnational companies has been instrumental to the creation, legitimacy, 
and efficacy of civil regulations.295 
A number of Western governments, particularly those in Europe, are 
supporting civil regulations. The European Union has offered substantial 
support for global CSR. 296  Some European governments implicitly  
endorse CSR by demanding that firms trading on their stock exchanges 
distribute annual reports detailing environmental and social perfor-
mance.297 Additionally, public pension funds are either encouraged or, at 
times, required to take firms’ environmental and social track records into 
account in choosing investments.298 Moreover, some governments grant 
preferences for privately certified merchandise pursuant to their pro-
curement policies.299 
Various features of civil regulation resemble characteristically Euro-
pean attitudes toward business regulation. That is, the European Union, 
along with a number of European governments, lean heavily on volunta-
ry agreements and soft-law, often turning to nonstate actors to formulate 
regulatory standards. 300  In the eyes of some European governmental  
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authorities, endorsing global civil regulations is a convenient way of  
assuaging home-country activists and trade unions that may well be  
antagonistic to globalization and the immense political sway held by 
multinational companies.301 This, however, does not grant nation-states 
sole regulatory authority over firms operating in their territories. 
Thus one notable benefit of civil regulations as a mechanism of global 
business regulation is that their terms are outside the World Trade  
Organization’s (“WTO”) purview, as the WTO’s regulations have force 
only if accepted by national governments.302 Whereas the WTO deems 
government-mandated eco-labels to constitute potential trade barriers, 
private product certifications and labels do not have that status.303 Simi-
larly, whereas companies could require global suppliers’ compliance 
with environmental rules and labor standards as a prerequisite for trans-
acting business, governments typically may not condition market access 
upon such requirements.304 
In the case of co-regulation and multi-stakeholder partnerships, CSR’s 
focus shifts away from voluntariness and toward accountability backed 
by enforcement mechanisms. 305  Accordingly, public accountability  
mechanisms for private actors constitute a centerpiece of the emerging 
global governance paradigm. 306  As illustrated below, such emerging  
governance networks are “held in orbit” around the notion of reputational 
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capital. Reputational sanctions and rewards linked to global firms’ most 
valuable asset (reputational capital) therefore constitute an emerging 
mode of accountability in global governance.307 Global firms utilize cor-
porate legitimacy management to shift the role of businesses in society at 
large.308 Meanwhile, multi-stakeholder initiatives provide the forum for a 
dialogue between business and society—a dialogue that is required for 
accountability mechanisms to work. 309  Moreover, involvement in  
co-regulation and enforcement of multi-stakeholder devices is connected 
with the new idea of corporate citizenship, or what has been termed  
“political activism.”310 Through these devices, citizens can participate in 
dialogue with, and can influence, the conduct of businesses in the  
environmental and social spheres.311 
E. Why Global Businesses Adopt Voluntary Regulations 
1. Protecting Reputations 
To a significant extent, the growth and influence of civil regulations is 
attributable to the rise of global brands. The pervasiveness of branding 
means that companies are becoming increasingly vulnerable to attacks on 
their reputations in consumer, labor, and financial markets. Moreover, 
firms’ reputations are susceptible to technological advancements in 
communication via broadband internet, coupled with the advent of de-
centralized and globally available media, such as Facebook, YouTube, 
and Twitter, to name a few, as well as the proliferation of inexpensive 
voice and text communication via wireless handheld devices.312 Such 
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technologies subject companies to attack by blogs, spoofs, e-mail  
campaigns, parasites, and other protest campaigns.313 This technology 
has made it easier for activists to obtain and disseminate information 
concerning business conduct at the speed of light around the globe.314 
Thus, inability to hide, literally and figuratively, in a distant part of the 
world has made reputation a valuable commodity. 
Consequently, the bulk of civil regulations emerge as a result of citizen 
campaigns aimed at specific business behavior, enterprises, or industry 
sectors.315 The number of such campaigns has gradually increased over 
the past two decades.316 They address workplace conditions, fair wages, 
child labor, agricultural worker compensation, sustainable forestry prac-
tices, corruption, environmental preservation, and human rights.317 Such 
campaigns to “name and shame” corporate character have targeted prom-
inent companies including Citibank, Exxon, Levi-Strauss, Monsanto, 
Nike, Royal Dutch Shell, The Gap, Nestlé, Rio Tinto, Starbucks, Union 
Carbide, and Wal-Mart.318 The assault on corporate character through 
modern media, reaching audiences globally, has pressured transnational 
companies to behave with increased responsibility.319 
The combination of two trends, in CSR and firms’ building and pre-
servation of their reputational capital, has manifested in a nascent 
framework of global governance. The movement has led companies to 
develop environmental and social standards and to formulate strategies 
that impact their supply chains.320 Additionally, companies have begun to 
reconfigure as “relational corporations,” from “vertical” to “flat” and 
from domestic to international.321  They have also begun to transition 
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away from managing relationships and toward building relationships.322 
Moreover, in cooperation with civil society actors, firms continue to  
implement settled transnational, environmental, and social regulation 
standards, which substantially impact the firms’ reputations.323 
2. Breakdown in Global Governance 
Over the last twenty years, globalization has transformed the world 
economic landscape. 324  The situs of manufacturing has moved from  
industrialized nations to developing nations.325 In addition, global corp-
orations’ production and supply chains transcend national borders more 
than ever.326 The bulk of transnational commerce occurs among firms or 
inter-firm networks.327 The rise of global civil regulation has, in signifi-
cant measure, resulted from the recognition that globalization dampens 
the ability of national legal authorities to effectively regulate global 
companies and markets.328 Hence, it has been observed that, although 
some multinational firms are as powerful as some small nation-states, 
they are less accountable.329 
While state and international business regulations are still growing in 
range and degree, today’s global economy, while highly integrated, is 
plagued by regulatory breakdown.330 The multinational nature of global 
manufacturing strains national governments’ abilities to control econom-
ic activity outside of, and straddling, their own territories.331 National and 
global regulatory frameworks will remain dangerously ineffective so 
long as national governments and global companies alike are incapable 
of controlling, or ill-disposed to control the international trade’s envi-
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ronmental and socioeconomic externalities. Yet, the rise of civil regula-
tion does not signify an outright replacement of state regulation. Rather, 
it signifies an attempt to expand regulation to a broad array of transna-
tional corporate conduct that remains difficult to regulate via purely  
national mechanism.332 The advent of novel types of public civil regulation 
has resulted in reputational accountability, complementing nation-states’ 
regulations that have proven inadequate in the era of globalization.333 
IV. REPUTATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
As a result of major industry scandals, coupled with the recent global 
financial meltdown, and motivated by accountability principles, corpo-
rate management is implementing ethical, transparency, and disclosure 
standards.334  The following discussion aims to highlight the need for 
global corporate governance to recognize the crucial role of the rule of 
reputation. The need to adopt voluntary civil regulations is especially 
strong for firms operating in the global environment. The traditional con-
cept of legal accountability is distinguishable from the emerging concept 
of reputational accountability. As will be shown, the latter is especially 
intricate since it entails multifaceted components of accountability. This 
section will illustrate how the reputational capital model of corporate 
governance influences managerial decision-making—namely, how  
managers seek to accommodate the burgeoning demands for reputational 
accountability under the emerging regime of civil regulations. 
A. Legal Accountability 
Legal accountability simply means that normative regulatory standards 
are enforceable. 335  Compliance with black-letter legal rules creates a  
presumption of validity in the eyes of judicial tribunals or quasi-judicial 
forums.336 The notion of legal accountability stems from the rule of law 
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maxim.337 A vast body of civil and criminal law has developed to hold 
non- and for-profit institutions legally accountable.338 In the international 
arena, the WTO Dispute Settlement System, the Hague International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court, are just some 
of the institutions that enforce “hard” international law.339 Of course, an 
actor’s failure to comply with law will typically trigger reputational sanc-
tions as well; and compliance may provide for its own reputational  
rewards.340 
Similar to the early international law phenomena, civil regulations,  
absent hard enforcement mechanisms, function as mere normative stan-
                                                                                                             
OF LAW 197 (1961) (noting that if the “system is fair,” it “may gain and retain alle-
giance”). 
 337. Throughout the latter part of the 20th century, one of the central topics addressed 
by legal philosophers was the nature of the rule of law. See Robert P. George, Reason, 
Freedom, and the Rule of Law: Their Significance in the Natural Law Tradition, 46 AM. 
J. JURIS. 249, 249 (2001). Arguably one reason for the keen attention extended to the 
concept was the rise and decline of totalitarian governments. See id. “In the aftermath of 
the defeat of Nazism, legal philosophers of every religious persuasion tested their legal 
theories by asking, for example, whether the Nazi regime constituted a legal system in 
any meaningful sense.” Id. Following the collapse of communism throughout Europe, 
scholars of jurisprudence sought to account for the manner in which legal institutions and 
procedures foster respectable democracies. See id. Today, the rise of global civil regula-
tions for business leads to the analogous question of whether, and to what extent, such 
initiatives embody the rule of law. On this point, reference to the fundamental comp-
onents of legality is illuminating. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. 
ed. 1964) (Basic elements constituting the “internal morality” of law are: non-
retroactivity, amenability to compliance, promulgation, clarity, coherence, temporal  
constancy, generality, and congruence between official behavior and rules.). Arguably, 
global business civil regulations display many if not all of these characteristics. 
 338. See Parker, supra note 181, at 207–17; see also Alnoor Ebrahim, Making Sense of 
Accountability: Conceptual Perspectives for Northern and Southern Nonprofits, 14 NON-
PROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 191, 194–95 (2003). 
 339. Concerning violence and nation-states, enormous changes have come about in 
relevant international standards, practices, and institutions. War crimes tribunals and the 
International Criminal Court were established in order to make accountable, to the point 
of incarceration, chiefs of states that deploy violence aimed at their own populace. These 
developments represent a tremendous departure from customary norms governing the 
principle of national sovereignty. That principle extended immunity to heads of states 
from legal petitions for accountability, save from members of their own principalities. 
Indeed, an inaugural precept of the nation-state system, observed all the way from West-
phalia in 1648 to Nuremberg in 1946, dictated that heads of states enjoyed immunity 
from prosecution. See Geoffrey Robertson, Ending Impunity: How International Crimi-
nal Law Can Put Tyrants on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 649, 650 (2005). 
 340. See Ross, supra note 32, at 11. 
90 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
dards and are intended to persuade compliance.341 Corporations comply 
with soft law in order to protect their intangible reputational assets; it is 
not that they are deterred by enforcement sanctions.342 Arguably, a re-
gime of global civil regulations and the accompanying rule of reputation 
comprise an integral part of both the domestic and international rule of 
law. They are, however, often ignored by commentators because they are 
only backed by reputational sanctions, the nature and extent of which are 
not always fully appreciated.343 To fully account for the ontology of civil 
regulation and actors’ compliance internationally, the concept of reputa-
tional capital must be incorporated into our current thinking about corp-
orate governance. A deeper inquiry into the various sources of soft law, 
however, reveals its intricacy and complexity. Global civil regulations 
embody a compromise among private and public entities. Rather than 
imposing cost of compliance with formal regulation, civil regulations 
encourage corporations to examine their conduct and guide it by means 
of voluntary self-regulation.344 Global civil regulations are continually 
undergoing an organic evolution, yet national law depends on its institu-
tions to act, which takes longer.345 
B. Reputational Accountability 
From the standpoint of the conventional rule of law maxim and its  
experience, voluntary CSR seems utterly inadequate. That is, CSR is de-
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centralized, it carries conflicting norms, it is run by bureaucrats,346 and 
there are no hard sanctions for noncompliance.347 The concept of reputa-
tional accountability offers an explanation for how the enforcement of 
civil regulations makes global firms more accountable. Accountability 
means that actors may ensure that other actors also follow standards, and 
may apply sanctions for noncompliance with those standards.348 In the 
context of global corporate governance, civil regulations that impact a 
firm’s reputational capital arguably represent the strongest sanctions, as a 
firm’s most valuable, albeit intangible, asset is its reputation.349 
1. Elements of Reputational Accountability 
The process of corporate reputational accountability involves the fol-
lowing three components.350 First, reputational accountability presuppos-
es the existence of civil regulations that hold companies accountable; 
thus, compliance is expected.351 Similar to the maxim that the law must 
be knowable—i.e., that it must be published by the State so that citizens 
can discover what rights and responsibilities are given or imposed upon 
them by law—civil regulations must also be a matter of common know-
ledge.352 Second, reputational accountability requires that “enforcement 
agents” possess relevant information about firms’ actions to evaluate 
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compliance with applicable civil regulations.353 Thus, on the one hand, to 
be held accountable, firms must be aware of the expectations.354 On the 
other hand, enforcement agents must know by what standards to render 
an assessment of business conduct.355 Because accurate information is 
essential, some measure of transparency and dialogue among stakehold-
ers appears to be a prerequisite for reputational accountability.356 Third, 
reputational accountability depends upon the existence of incentives for 
compliance.357 That is, enforcement agents must be able to impose repu-
tational sanctions or reputational rewards.358 Of course, no worldwide 
government, democratic or otherwise, exists to provide wholesale regula-
tion.359 Consequently, demands for corporate accountability are decentra-
lized and, thus, diffused. 
2. Enforcement of the Rule of Reputation 
Whereas the concept of legal accountability derives its central meaning 
from the notion of the rule of law (ultimately upheld by courts), the con-
cept of reputational accountability may be understood in terms of the rule 
of reputation. The rule of reputation is upheld by market participants that 
evaluate business conduct within several forums. For instance, the  
“Forum of Key Constituents” is especially significant for business enter-
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prises. 360  “Key Constituents” are firms’ customers, employees, and  
investors, whose authority and control are exerted in transactions occur-
ring in consumer, labor, and capital markets respectively.361 For example, 
individual investors as well as mutual funds may cease investing in com-
panies whose practices or policies they find objectionable. 362  Some 
pension funds shun securities of certain companies, often on the basis of 
criteria determined by their beneficiaries.363 Alternatively, investors may 
require higher interest rates on corporate bonds.364 Further, customers 
may decline to purchase the products produced by firms struck by nega-
tive publicity stemming from human rights violations, unfair labor prac-
tices, or environmental violations.365 It has been shown that consumers 
are willing to incur added costs, such as the cost of traveling greater dis-
tances, in order to punish retailers whose conduct they find egregiously 
unfair.366 Finally, those in employment markets may select among com-
peting job offers on the basis of the prospective employer’s publicity and 
reputation.367  
Business partners and associates comprise another type of forum for 
the evaluation of conduct. This forum functions as a peer-driven reputa-
tional accountability network powered by the process of business partners’ 
reciprocal appraisals.368 Institutional lenders, for instance, use caution in 
scrutinizing their borrowers’ creditworthiness as well as that of their 
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partners’ borrowers.369 Business enterprises that are rated low by their 
peers are less likely to find willing business partners among them.370 
These businesses find themselves in a strategic disadvantage and there-
fore tend to stagnate.371 
Next is the forum of public opinion, or the proverbial “court of public 
opinion.”372 Public reputational accountability means that members of 
civil society penalize companies by promulgating negative publicity.373 
Lawmakers, courts, government regulators, fiscal watchdogs, journalists, 
competitors, licensing boards, rating agencies, and markets, all render 
judgments about the reputations of market participants.374 In fact, reputa-
tion constitutes a type of “soft power,” which has been characterized as 
“the ability to shape the preferences of others.”375 Companies with tar-
nished reputations find it hard to establish relationships, assert authority, 
or attract loyalty from others.376 
The Royal Dutch Shell scandal involving the Brent Spar and the Ogoni 
in Nigeria presents a vivid example of a company experiencing a reputa-
tional crisis as a result of its failure to comply with public social expecta-
tions and its neglect of both environmental and human rights stan-
dards.377 In 1995, Shell made plans to sink a large decommissioned oil 
buoy storage rig in the North Sea. It conducted an environmental impact 
assessment and gained approval from the government of Great Britain.378 
Greenpeace activists challenged the proposed deep-sea dumping and  
alleged that Shell’s sinking the rig would cause serious environmental 
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damage.379 Shell disputed the claim on scientific grounds and maintained 
that sinking was the best available option.380 Since Shell refused to aban-
don its plans, Greenpeace, acting in front of television crews, surrounded 
the rig with small boats and even occupied it.381 Millions of protests 
erupted throughout Europe.382 In response to Greenpeace’s pressure and 
the boycotts, Shell abandoned its sinking strategy and towed the rig to a 
Norwegian fiord.383 
Reversing its original plan cost Shell considerable expense.384 In addi-
tion, when Shell failed in the same year to intercede to stop the execution 
of Ken Saro-Wiwa in Nigeria, voices worldwide expressed indigna-
tion.385 Saro-Wiwa, a writer, businessman, and political journalist, had 
organized the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People to take a 
stand against mounting problems with Shell and the government of  
Nigeria.386 Saro-Wiwa, along with nine others, was tried for the murder 
of four Nigerian officials, a fabricated accusation.387 Saro-Wiwa was not 
tried by a traditional court, but rather a special tribunal that refused to 
admit evidence of innocence.388 As the defendants were found guilty and 
sentenced to death, Shell stated that political issues were not their  
concern.389 Magazines and newspapers roundly called for punishment of 
Nigeria and Shell, the Sierra Club initiated a massive boycott campaign 
against the company, and celebrities advocated a U.S. oil embargo.390 
Shell’s subsequent efforts to revive its reputation in the aftermath of the 
Spar and Nigerian scandals, while very expensive, were successful at 
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averting a public relations crisis, which could have been relentless.391 By 
contrast, companies that achieve superior reputations within each of the 
above forums, enjoy a host of advantages.392 In that sense, reputational 
accountability involves not just punishing firms but also rewarding them 
for their compliance with civil regulations and commitment to CSR. 
C. Networks of Reputational Accountability 
Reputational accountability in global economic governance is multifa-
ceted. Global companies operate within networks of continuous relation-
ships. Firms are linked with their customers, suppliers, and even rivals 
via strategic alliances.393 When companies enter into arrangements with 
various parties, such as government regulators and special interest groups, 
they are in effect establishing “reputational networks.” These networks 
form a variety of channels of accountability, which are divided by and 
cover a range of topical areas. On the other hand, relationships involving 
international organizations typically establish sequences of accountabili-
ty.394 In addition, multiple intersecting accountability relationships exist 
when different groups of market participants, with potentially diverse 
interests, set out to hold other agents accountable for their behavior.395 
In the modern business environment, companies confront manifold and 
frequently incompatible or contradictory reputational accountability de-
mands.396 Often it is not sufficient to meet the demands of shareholders 
and credit markets.397 Moreover, it is not enough to comply with legal 
rules as law often lags behind rapidly evolving social norms.398 Busi-
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nesses, however, must remain mindful of their constituencies’—peers, 
the media, and advocacy groups—reactions to their actions. Various calls 
for reputational accountability concerning a firm’s conduct reveal con-
flicting expectations of outside observers.399 
A reputational crisis can also rapidly spread to infect an extensive net-
work. For example, the uncovering of accounting irregularities at the 
Indian outsourcing firm Satyam Computer Services, Ltd. led to imme-
diate suspicion about the firm’s global auditor, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
and prompted a group of its clients, including Cigna, Citigroup, Coca-
Cola, GlaxoSmithKline, Merrill Lynch, Nissan, Novartis, Pfizer, and 
State Farm Insurance to move their business away from the firm.400 
D. Reputational Accountability is Dynamic 
Mandates for reputational accountability undergo a constant process of 
change as activist campaigns are impermanent and public interest and 
attention are constantly shifting; in general, however, the bar continues to 
rise.401 For example, only a few decades ago, controversy regarding envi-
ronmental and labor conditions was almost nonexistent, whereas today it 
is front and center.402 Those unable to forecast these shifts tend to lag 
behind the current norms.403 As far as reputational accountability is con-
cerned, such lag may cause strategic problems.404 New laws and regula-
tions may be enacted, the ire of civil society activists raised, or reputa-
tions sullied before managers implement remedial measures. Thus, a key 
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motivation for companies to become industry leaders in building reputa-
tional capital is the need for additional insurance against reputational 
harm from negative publicity and pressures that may be detrimental to 
the company.405 In such instances, having a superior reputation may turn 
out to be a global company’s most valuable asset, albeit an intangible 
one.406 
E. Implications for Global Operations 
To integrate the considerations of reputational capital into global cor-
porate governance is to recognize the corporation’s reputation as a pro-
ductive asset that generates capital, not only for the firm’s shareholders, 
but ultimately for a broad range of constituents. Of course, reputational 
capital goes unrecorded on corporate balance sheets. But creating share-
holder value extends beyond capitalization on traditional balance sheet 
assets; it also entails leveraging value from the company’s reputational 
capital.407 
A firm will realize competitive advantage by correctly forecasting 
“new waves” of civil society’s expectations for responsible corporate 
conduct. Corporate officers must develop the ability to effectively reach 
consensus with key decision makers regarding new waves of demand for 
CSR.408 To become industry leaders in terms of CSR standards, corpora-
tions must implement internal ethical standards and focus on their visions, 
developing strategies to beat the competition. Having to define accounta-
bility requirements imposes a burden and diverts managers from profit-
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creating activity.409 If firms fail to comply with reputational accountabili-
ty requirements, however, they may eventually face reputational sanc-
tions. Still, over time, industry as a whole seeks to catch up with its lead-
ers and innovators.410 At this point, no special advantage comes from 
compliance with the new norms. Nevertheless, the emerging global civil 
regulations function as sign-posts for corporations. Following their 
trends, firms may institutionalize norms to respond to their demands. 
V. CRITICISMS AND REPLIES 
On the one hand, the advent of global civil regulation and CSR has 
been hailed as a panacea to the unhealthy symptoms caused by the inabil-
ity of nation-states to regulate internationally.411 For example, laws are 
often outpaced by rapidly developing technology.412 This often happens 
in technical fields, such as the supervision and regulation of risk in the 
banking industry.413 In this context, international industry leaders call for 
allowing institutions’ own risk models to participate in financial regula-
tion.414 On the other hand, while acknowledging the numerous positive 
aspects of self-regulation, critics contend that voluntary business regula-
tions are intrinsically unable provide a comprehensive regulatory land-
scape, especially because transnational firms may evade regulation by 
relocating.415 Moreover, critics allege that civil regulations are too soft 
when it comes to regulating conduct as compared to the hard rule of 
law.416 For example, absent any adjudicative institution with multinational 
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or international jurisdiction, it is difficult to obtain redress for human 
rights violations if the victim’s home state does not provide the same.417 
In addition, conceptual difficulties arise to the extent that civil regula-
tions amount to self-regulation and are voluntary codes that merely codify 
firms’ or their primary subjects’ responsibilities.418 A potential drawback 
is the perception that compliance with the codes is undertaken on a pure-
ly voluntary or discretionary basis.419 Nevertheless, logic dictates that 
responsibility for human rights, in their broad sense,420 stems from the 
fundamental maxim that people possess a bundle of human rights that 
may not be transgressed.421 Acknowledging the universality of the human 
rights principle negates the notion that firms’ human rights responsibilities 
are purely voluntary or discretionary. Rather, the universal maxim of 
human rights imposes overriding obligations on transnational firms.  
Human rights norms fall squarely within the category of hypernorms.422 
Therefore, any CSR initiative that seeks to comply with human rights 
hypernorms should be viewed as mandatory, rather than discretionary. 
The Integrative Social Contract Theory, however, fails to account for 
why corporations commit their resources to advancing human rights. 
While detailing the firms’ decision making processes, the ISCT focuses 
on mechanisms for resolving conflicts between authentic norms and 
hypernorms.423 The theory does not address the businesses’ economic 
motivations, resources, or competencies.424 The ISCT framework is thus 
deficient. Under the ISCT, a firm’s decision to act responsibly with  
respect to human rights remains discretionary, or, within “moral free 
space.”425 This, however, betrays the nondiscretionary nature of human 
rights. An alternative theory is necessary—namely, the theory of reputa-
tional capital. The latter best accounts for how firms, recognizing the 
mandatory nature of human rights obligations, can expect support from 
civil society while proactively advancing them, thus improving their  
financial and social standing. 
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While the practical impact of civil regulations is slight, it is neverthe-
less palpable. The scores of intergovernmental treaties and agreements 
have been ineffective, at least in the area of ecological preservation.426 
Civil regulations provide greater influence than inter-governmental trea-
ties with respect to human rights, workplace conditions, and forestry 
practices as they reach beyond national borders.427 Yet in the absence of 
universally accepted criteria for assessing such impact, it is difficult to 
draw solid conclusions. 
But the reputational pressure is on. In order to effectuate positive 
change in businesses’ environmental and socioeconomic practices in the 
developing world, activists in the West make public demands on well-
reputed, high-profile transnational companies based in Europe and the 
United States.428 These demands and pressures often obviate the need for 
governmental involvement in the sphere that is left unchecked due to 
governments’ limitations.429 The main aim in this process is to transfer 
the more demanding regulatory guidelines from the developed world to 
businesses, industries, and markets in the developing world.430 In doing 
so, civil regulations cause the “California effect”—the export of higher 
standards through international trade.431 
Of course, international civil regulations are arguably more effective 
than the human rights, environmental, and labor standards originating 
from the developing world.432 Indeed, civil regulations are almost the 
exclusive source of effective business regulation for many developing 
countries.433 Global civil regulations have led to greater levels of com-
pliance with human rights, workplace, and environmental standards by 
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Western companies or their affiliates operating in a developing region.434 
However, some would deny this claim or discount its significance.435 
Indeed, the traditional regimes of hard law and the emerging regimes of 
soft law are capable of working together.436 They are not mutually exclu-
sive vehicles for corporate governance. While civil regulations offset 
some deficiencies in governmental regulation, they need not completely 
replace or substitute the hard regulation that originates in domestic,  
regional, or global arenas. The continuing success of private global busi-
ness regulation hinges on the degree to which its standards and its in-
strumentalities for accountability can be successfully incorporated into, 
and strengthened by, regulatory procedures backed by both traditional 
legal sanctions and emergent reputational sanctions at domestic, regional, 
and transnational levels.437 
Another criticism is that manufacturers in the developing world con-
sider the Western civil regulations to be a burden on their develop-
ment.438 Critics point out that compliance with Western codes elevates 
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business costs.439 Consequently, companies in developing countries are 
tempted to follow the bare minimum in terms of compliance with  
requirements foisted upon them by Western contractors.440 Their rela-
tionships with private inspectors and ethics auditors often turn hostile 
and even involve instances of deception.441 
Similar criticisms are leveled at Western companies as well. Critics 
contend that Western firms adopt civil regulations merely as public rela-
tions ploys to divert attention away from wrongdoing, or as marketing 
strategies, or in reaction to public and peer influences.442 For example, 
the Global Compact is accused of “blue washing.”443 It permits member-
companies to exhibit the blue logo of the United Nations, while ignoring 
their failure to file annual reports and their mere token efforts to comply 
with the Compact’s standards.444 Thus, critics contend that the corpora-
tions become free-riders.445 Some companies have even been accused of 
violating the Compact’s principles.446 
Nevertheless, not all CSR initiatives lack genuine commitment. Argu-
ably, those with genuine respect for civil regulations, as opposed to their 
mere instrumental value for good business, are most likely to reap long 
term reputational and financial rewards. The public, in the long run, is 
able to discern which firms exhibit a genuine commitment to CSR.447 
Indeed, the critics’ assertions that many corporations act insincerely  
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presuppose that it is possible to distinguish disingenuous public relations 
ploys from sincere moral commitments. In other words, the skeptic’s 
argument assumes what it wants to deny—that corporations are behaving 
wrongly when they use CSR superficially instead of honoring environ-
mental and social standards for their own sake. If it were true that all 
corporations always act insincerely, meaning, therefore, that they are 
incapable of acting otherwise, then what would be the point of drawing 
our attention to, and condemning, such behavior? 
In addition, critics doubt whether firms that proactively comply with 
civil regulations in order to merely enhance profitability can ultimately 
grow reputational capital.448 In other words, critics insist that the pure 
profit motivation necessarily taints any purported ethical act. Addressing 
this important objection requires reflection upon two fundamental points. 
First, wealth creation is itself a source of public good.449 Second, while 
getting reputational rewards from CSR most likely requires genuine 
commitment, it is unnecessary and likely impossible to gauge the degree 
of its authenticity, as the motives for corporate compliance with CSR are 
notoriously complex.450 The public, however, deplores corporate market-
ing and public relations campaigns masquerading as citizenship and  
social responsibility initiatives, especially when used to divert attention 
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from a firm’s own misconduct.451 As has been shown, activists have been 
quick to expose firms that engage in disingenuous image-laundering tac-
tics.452 Any attempt to deceive the public, in today’s age of far-reaching, 
decentralized media, will quickly cause reputational harm. 
In other words, reputational capital is generated from CSR backed by 
genuine intention. A company will find it difficult to capitalize on com-
pliance with civil regulations unless it has explicitly declared its moral 
commitment. Companies that exhibit the “it pays to be ethical” attitude 
will be undermining their efforts in the long run. From a purely financial 
standpoint, it arguably pays to appreciate the intrinsic value of good 
business conduct. Executives of multinational corporations should guide 
their organizations’ actions by this premise. 
Finally, some critics contend that the bulk of global CSR practices re-
semble corporate philanthropic efforts in the sense that they are situated 
at the outer margins rather than at the core of firms’ business strate-
gies.453 Thus, critics see the CSR practices more as constituting inoculation 
against public denunciation than as an effort at long-term competitive 
advantage. On the other hand, such companies as American Apparel, 
British Petroleum, Seventh Generation, Starbucks, Timberland, and 
Whole Foods make CSR commitments a vital component of their brands 
and their core business policies.454 As it is commonly suggested in order 
to debunk the widespread misconception that costly Madison Avenue 
advertising campaigns do not really work: if that were really true, then 
why would companies continue to spend so much on them? 
CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to delineate the transformative trends in 
global governance that are backed by reputational capital. This change is 
taking place through emerging civil regulations enforced by reputational 
accountability mechanisms established by global civil society to impose 
responsibility on firms for environmental and social standards. Several 
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factors have caused the emergence of CSR, including: economic globali-
zation, the development of global civil society, and the role multinational 
enterprises have begun to play as private authorities. The efforts of busi-
nesses to advance human rights and to promote ethical, responsible, and 
sustainable practices continue to mature, manifesting in the advent of 
civil regulations and the emergence of a regime of global economic  
governance. 
The rise of CSR is also the result of firms—pressured by the corporate 
accountability movement—seeking to address the social and ecological 
byproducts of their conduct. A set of self-regulating norms and mechan-
isms, along with multi-stakeholder initiatives and co-regulation, guide 
CSR. The global corporate governance paradigm continues to be shaped 
by ethical standards and the pursuit of greater accountability for business. 
As corporate social responsibility adjusts to meet expectations for trans-
national business conduct, it will coalesce within the space of reputational 
capital theory. Thus, reputational accountability will continue to fill the 
ever-expanding gap between national regulations and the burgeoning 
multitude of “soft law” civil regulations. 
